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THE "EVIL" DEFENDANT AND THE "HOLDOUT" JUROR:
UNPACKING THE MYTHS OF THE AURORA THEATER
SHOOTING CASE AS WE PONDER THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN COLORADO
KRISTEN NELSON, TAMARA BRADY, AND DANIEL KINGt
ABSTRACT
On August 7, 2015, after a trial lasting a total of almost seven
months, an Arapahoe County jury returned a verdict that spared our cli-
ent, James Holmes, from the death penalty.' Mr. Holmes was convicted
of killing twelve people and wounding seventy others at a midnight
premiere of The Dark Knight Rises at the Century 16 movie theater in
Aurora, Colorado, on July 20, 2012.2 His crime was one of the most hor-
rific and tragic acts of mass violence in recent American history.3
Following the jury's life verdict, two troubling narratives have been
advanced in the public discourse about the case. The first is that while
Mr. Holmes may suffer from some form of mental illness, he is also
"evil," and his "evil" nature, rather than his mental illness, drove him to
commit these unspeakable acts.4 The second is that a lone "holdout" on
the jury who refused to budge in his or her opposition to the death penal-
ty thwarted the remainder of the jurors from imposing the death sentence
they thought Mr. Holmes deserved.
t Kristen Nelson is a Deputy State Public Defender with the Office of the Colorado State
Public Defender, Tamara Brady is a Chief Trial Deputy for the Office of the Colorado State Public
Defender, and Daniel King is a Chief Trial Deputy for the Office of the Colorado State Public De-
fender. We would like to specially acknowledge the members of the defense team, as well as others
to whom we owe special thanks: Rebekka Higgs, Katherine Spengler, John Gonglach, Kevin Bishop,
Rhonda Crandall, Sherilyn Koslosky, Nova Whorton, Jonathan Coen, Nicholas Sweet, Rachel Fin-
ger, and Jason Middleton.
I. See Final Sentencing Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist.
Ct. Aug. I1, 2015) (referencing the Final Sentencing Verdict Forms for all twenty-four counts
sought against James Holmes); Jack Healy, Life Sentence for James Holmes, Aurora Theater Gun-
man, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/08/us/jury-decides-fate-of-
james-holmes-aurora-theater-gunman.html.
2. See Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 22, 2015)
(referencing the Verdict Forms for all twenty-four counts sought against James Holmes); Jack Healy
& Julie Turkewitz, Guilty Verdict for James Holmes in Aurora Attack, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/james-holmes-guilty-in-aurora-movie-theater-shooting.html.
3. See Elizabeth Chuck & Helen Kwong, Tragic List: The Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S.
History, NBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/deadliest-
mass-shootings-u-s-history-n437086.
4. See, e.g., Carol McKinley, Coffee with George Brauchler: Theater Shooting Case DA Sits
Back, CU NEWS CORPS (Aug. 22, 2015), http://cunewscorps.com/3579/aurora-theater-trial/coffee-
with-george-brauchler-theater-shooting-case-da-lays-back/.
5. See, e.g., Sadie Gurman, Theater Shooter Spared from Death Penalty by One Juror's
Holdout, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2015, 10:07 AM),
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In this Article, we examine each of these narratives in turn. In doing
so, we first unpack them. We conclude that, while convenient and per-
haps even understandable, they are overly simplistic. Indeed, upon fur-
ther scrutiny, neither of them have a solid factual or legal basis. We then
explain why it is not only unhelpful but problematic to continue to legit-
imize and promote these myths about the case. Finally, in light of our
discussion about these false narratives, we consider what lessons about
the death penalty Coloradoans should draw from the case as we ponder
the future of capital punishment in our state.
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I. THE MYTH OF THE "EVIL" DEFENDANT
In the immediate wake of the tragedy, and long before any infor-
mation about Mr. Holmes's mental health was publicly available, the
phrase "evil" cropped up in the media's coverage of the case. Addressing
a crowd in Fort Myers, Florida, on Friday, July 20, 2012, just hours after
the shooting, the press quoted President Barack Obama as stating, "Such
violence, such evil is senseless. It's beyond reason."6 On July 21, 2012, a
columnist for the Washington Post wrote, "All such crimes can be de-
scribed as senseless, or as the manifestation of evil, but what unfolded
Friday at the midnight showing of the new Batman movie was something
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/theater-shooter-spared-from-death-penalty-by-one-jurors-
holdout 55cf4564e4b0ab468d9d7a8b.
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that so far lacks even a madman's explanation." Just four days after the
shooting, a clinical psychiatrist published an article on Psychology To-
day's website entitled "The Colorado Shooter: Psychotic Victim or Evil
Killer?"8
The phrase continued to appear in headlines once the trial got un-
derway. "Insane or evil? Trial fills in details of Colorado movie gunman
Holmes," questioned the headline of an article published during the mer-
its phase of the trial.9 At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial,
the media's coverage pitted the prosecution's and defense's final closing
arguments as a battle of "'Evil' vs. 'mercy.",to
The narrative that Mr. Holmes was not just mentally ill, but "evil,"
picked up intensity following the final sentencing verdict. "I think he's
got a mental illness," the elected district attorney, George Brauchler, told
a reporter in an interview published online several days before the court
formally sentenced Mr. Holmes." "I don't know what that mental illness
is, but there's no doubt he thinks differently than you or I do and thank-
fully most of the rest of the world."l 2 According to the article, Mr. Brau-
chler then continued:
It's interesting to note that when the first DSM (Editor's note: Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) came out, it had
60 diagnosable afflictions. The one that came out two years ago that
we relied upon heavily in this case has 400. Are people getting more
mentally ill or are we just coming up with ways to diagnose aberrant
behavior and diagnose away evil? One thing is clear about this guy:
Mental illness and evil are not mutually exclusive. Could he have a
7. Joel Achenbach, Motive Still a Blank in Aurora Shooter's Story, WASH. POST (July 21,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/motive-still-a-blank-in-aurora-
shooters-story/2012/07/21/gJQAD69TOW story.html.
8. Dale Archer, The Colorado Shooter: Psychotic Victim or Evil Killer?, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(July 24, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/reading-between-the-headlines/201207/the-
colorado-shooter-psychotic-victim-or-evil-killer. In the article, Archer in fact hypothesizes that Mr.
Holmes is mentally ill and was psychotic at the time of the crime, and he advocates for the early
detection and treatment of mental illness. See id. Still, the article is notable for its sensational head-
line contrasting mental illness against the alternative, "evil."
9. Keith Coffman & Daniel Wallis, Insane or Evil? Trial Fills in Details of Colorado Movie
Gunman Holmes, REUTERS (May 1, 2015, 3:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/01/us-
usa-shooting-denver-idUSKBNONM4D320150501.
10. Maria L. La Ganga, James Holmes Jurors Begin Final Deliberations: 'Evil' vs. 'Mercy,'
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-james-holmes-
deliberations-20150806-story.htmi. This headline was derived from the question the prosecution
posed to the jury during its final arguments: "[W]hat is the appropriate sentence for such horror,
such evil[?]," as well as the defense's argument, "James Holmes i  sick, and he is damaged. ...
Mercy is what puts an end to violence. . . . Justice without mercy is raw vengeance." See id. (fourth
alternation in original) (quoting first Closing Argument of George Brauchler, Arapahoe Cnty. Dist.
Atty.; then quoting Closing Argument of Tamara Brady, Chief Deputy Public Defender).
I1. McKinley, supra note 4.
12. Id.
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mental illness and still make evil decisions knowing they're evil? The
jury said unequivocally and very quickly: Absolutely he could.13
In an online article published by People.com, the narrative of evil
versus mental illness was again advanced:
Holmes' [sic] attorneys had argued that he was mentally ill at the
time of the shooting.
Brauchler disagrees.
"He made a conscious, deliberate decision to do wrong," he says, his
voice rising slightly. "He knew it was wrong. He was writing that in
his journal. He said it was evil and he hated mankind. He knew he
was murdering human beings, and he wanted to do it because he
wanted to be evil."14
A day later, an article covering the conclusion of the formal sen-
tencing proceeding began as follows, "Condemning movie massacre
gunman James Holmes to 12 life sentences and the maximum 3,318
years in prison for his rampage in a midnight screening of a Batman film,
a Colorado judge said on Wednesday that evil and mental illness are not
mutually exclusive."'5 The article continues, "[The judge] said whatever
illness Holmes may have suffered, there was overwhelming evidence that
a significant part of his conduct had been driven by 'moral obliquity,
mental depravity, . . . anger, hatred, revenge, or similar evil condi-
tions. ,,16
And approximately a month later, an online article began, "There is
legal insanity, and then there is pure evil, according to 1 8 th Judicial Dis-
trict Attorney George Brauchler."17 The article, reporting on a speech
Mr. Brauchler gave to Logan County Republicans "[flollowing an after-
noon of golf Sept. 26 at Riverview Golf Course," further reports that Mr.
Brauchler told the group, "When evil showed up there, it had been plan-
ning to do what it was going to do for over 2 /2 months."'
13. Id.
14. Steve Helling, Aurora Shooting Prosecutor George Brauchler: The James Holmes Trial
'Will Always Stay with Me,' PEOPLE MAG. (Aug. 25, 2015, 7:30 PM),
http://www.people.com/article/james-holmes-prosecutor-george-brauchler-talks-emotional-toll
(quoting statements made by George Brauchler to People magazine).
15. Keith Coffman, Colorado Movie Gunman Sentenced to 12 Lifetimes and 3,318 Years,
REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/26/us-usa-shooting-
denver-idUSKCNOQV I RV20150826.
16. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting statement of Carlos Samour, Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct.
Judge).
17. Forrest Hershberger, Prosecutor Says Holmes Case Was 'Pure Evil,' S. PLATTE SENTINEL
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A. What Is "Evil"?
Before we delve into assessing whether there are facts and evidence
to support this narrative of evil, it is worth pondering for a moment what
"evil" means. How is it defined? How is it measured?
There is no question that Mr. Holmes's act of opening fire on a
crowd of innocent moviegoers in the early morning hours of July 20,
2012, was incredibly horrific, shocking, and senseless. Nor can anyone
dispute that his actions damaged and destroyed the lives of hundreds, if
not thousands, of people and caused an incomprehensible amount of
grief and suffering in the community of Aurora and beyond. If the sole
metric by which "evil" is identified and measured was the amount of
harm caused by a person, then there would not be much debate about the
application of this term to Mr. Holmes or to his actions. Even Mr.
Holmes himself, in an online chat with his former girlfriend four months
before the shooting, used the phrase "evil" in an effort to explain that
what his broken mind was urging him to do-kill people-was a very
bad thing.19
But the narrative about evil that has been advanced in the media
seems to be about much more than just the amount of harm caused by
Mr. Holmes or his act in and of itself. Branding Mr. Holmes as "evil,"
regardless of, or perhaps in addition to, any mental illness he suffers
from, implies a judgment about Mr. Holmes's character, his true nature,
and his humanity-or, the proponents of this narrative would likely
claim, his lack thereof. As psychiatrist James L. Knoll puts it, "The word
evil . . . . It is 'emotionally loaded, morally judgmental, full of brimstone
and fire.' . . . Labeling someone as evil suggests that he or she is beyond
redemption. Defining someone as evil also suggests that the person is
permanently beyond human understanding . . .. 20
Yet identifying and labeling someone as "evil" may not be as sim-
ple as we might wish it to be. As Professor Carol Steiker argues in a cri-
tique of a recent book by legal and political philosopher Matthew Kra-
mer, which advances the eradication of evil from society as a moral justi-
fication for the death penalty, "[Tihe essential nature of other people is
more obdurately opaque than Kramer is willing to admit .... She
adds, "[W]hat we think we know about unquestioned evil is, in fact, up
19. Michael Roberts, Read Theater Shooter's Google Chats with Ex-GF: "What I Feel Like
Doing is Evil," WESTWORD (June 16, 2015, 7:01 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/read-
theater-shooters-google-chats-with-ex-gf-what-i-feel-like-doing-is-evil-6810733.
20. James L. Knoll, IV, The Recurrence of an Illusion: The Concept of "Evil" in Forensic
Psychiatry, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 105, 106 (2008) (citation omitted) (quoting June
Price Tangney & Jeff Stuewig, A Moral-Emotional Perspective on Evil Persons and Evil Deeds, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 327, 338 (Arthur Miller ed., 2004)).
21. Carol S. Steiker, Can/Should We Purge Evil Through Capital Punishment?, 9 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 367, 370 (2015) (reviewing MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2011)).
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for questioning and may be quite different from what it appears so bla-
tantly to be."22 Steiker worries "about our ability to distinguish the quali-
ty of moral depravity from the symptoms of defects or diseases that
might not only remove an actor from the realm of the extravagantly evil,
but even place him or her outside the legitimate reach of the criminal
sanction."2 3 She questions whether "the line between 'evil' on the one
hand, and 'sick' or 'broken' on the other, is sufficiently clear."24
Certainly, this is a line we should be concerned with before writing
Mr. Holmes off as "pure evil" because, as we explain below, the evi-
dence presented at trial unequivocally and conclusively demonstrated
that he is seriously and chronically mentally ill.
B. Evidence of Mr. Holmes's Mental Illness
Prior to trial, Mr. Holmes underwent sanity examinations conducted
by four different psychiatrists-two of whom the court appointed and
two of whom the defense retained.25 While the court-appointed doctors
disagreed with defense experts on the issue of whether Mr. Holmes met
the technical legal definition of insanity,26 all four psychiatrists funda-
mentally agreed on two important issues. First, they each concluded that
Mr. Holmes suffers from a serious and chronic mental illness that is on
the schizophrenia spectrum of disorders.2 7 Second, every single one of





25. Mr. Holmes was forensically examined by Dr. Jeffrey Metzner and Dr. William Reid,
both of whom were appointed by the court, and by Dr. Raquel Gur and Dr. Jonathan Woodcock,
who were hired by the defense.
26. In Colorado, a person is insane if the person is (a) "so diseased or defective in mind at the
time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect
to that act," or (b) if the person "suffer[s] from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or
defect that prevented the person from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of
a crime charged." COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-8-101.5 (2016).
27. Dr. Metzner testified that in his opinion, Mr. Holmes's "most likely diagnoses were
schizoaffective disorder, social anxiety disorder, and trichotillomania." Transcript of Record at 83,
People v. Holmes, No. 12CR 1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 8, 2015) [hereinafter June 8 Transcript].
Dr. Woodcock likewise opined that Mr. Holmes suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Transcript of
Record at 142, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 25, 2015) [hereinafter
June 25 Transcript]. Dr. Reid diagnosed Mr. Holmes with schizotypal personality disorder and
testified that he "may well meet the criteria for . . . delusional disorder." Transcript of Record at 63,
People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 4, 2015) [hereinafter June 4 Transcript].
Dr. Gur, an expert on schizophrenia at the University of Pennsylvania, diagnosed Mr. Holmes with
schizophrenia. Transcript of Record at 160, People v. Holmes, 12CRI 522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
7, 2012) [hereinafter July 7 Transcript]. Dr. Reid testified that, "the diagnoses may differ a little, but
I want to make it clear that we're all in the same -- in my opinion -- in the same ballpark." June 4
Transcript, supra, at 112.
28. See, e.g., June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 101-02. The jury also heard testimony from
two neuropsychologists who conducted testing on Mr. Holmes: Dr. Rose Manguso, who is employed
by the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo and conducted psychological testing of Mr.
Holmes along with another psychologist, B. Thomas Gray, at the request of Dr. Metzner, and Dr.
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According to the experts, the most pronounced symptoms of Mr.
Holmes's mental illness at the time of the shooting were delusions and
significant negative symptoms.2 9 A delusion is a "fixed beliefl] that [is]
not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence."30 Mr. Holmes's
primary delusional belief3 was that he could increase his "human capi-
tal" by killing other people.32 Negative symptoms are associated with
disruptions to normal emotions and behaviors. Mr. Holmes's negative
symptoms included a flat affect (diminished emotional expression),
alogia (paucity of speech), avolition (a decrease in motivated, self-
initiated, purposeful activities), anhedonia (decreased ability to experi-
ence pleasure from positive stimuli), and asociality (lack of interest in
social interactions).33 In addition to these symptoms, there was also tes-
timony at trial that Mr. Holmes had unusual perceptual experiences, such
as seeing flickerings or shadows in the months before the shootings,3 4
and exhibited paranoid thinking and excessive and chronic social anxie-
ty.35 Mr. Holmes also experienced a decrease in his level of function-
ing-including in his academic performance-in the period of time lead-
ing up to the shooting, which is consistent with a diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia. He further reported to examiners that he felt depressed in the
Robert Hanlon, a neuropsychologist at Northwestern University, who conducted testing at the re-
quest of the defense. See Transcript of Record at 20-263, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapa-
hoe Dist. Ct. July 2, 2015) [hereinafter July 2 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Robert
Hanlon); Transcript of Record at 92-206, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
1, 2015) [hereinafter July 1 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Rose M. Manguso); June 8
Transcript, supra note 27, at 133 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner). The testing
results of all of these doctors were consistent with a psychotic mental illness uch as schizoaffective
disorder or schizophrenia. See July 2 Transcript, supra, at I10-11; July I Transcript, supra, at 144-
45, 154-70. Moreover, the testing revealed absolutely no indication whatsoever that Mr. Holmes
was feigning his illness. See July 1 Transcript, supra, at 120-25; July 2 Transcript, supra, at 77-82.
29. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 23-25, 48-49, 62, 121 (referencing the
testimony of Dr. Raquel Gur); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 100-01, 104 (referencing the
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 149-50, 154-55 (refer-
encing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner); June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 65-66, 70-73
(referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
30. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 87 (5th ed. 2013).
31. Dr. Reid equivocated somewhat bout whether Mr. Holmes technically met the criteria for
delusional disorder. Nevertheless, he testified that "I'm pretty well convinced he has some experi-
ences of delusion. . . . I believe, at various times, he has had them and probably has some chronic
delusions as well." June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 64. With respect to the "human capital"
belief in particular, Dr. Reid questioned whether it may be a "philosophical belief' but ultimately
stated, "I lean toward the idea of delusion." Id. at 65-66.
32. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 136-38 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Raquel Gur); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 164-65 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jona-
than Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 78-79 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jef-
frey Metzner).
33. See, e.g., June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 155, 187.
34. See, e.g., June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 71. Doctors differed in their opinions as to
whether these visual perceptions were, in fact, hallucinations.
35. See id at 71-73.
36. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 140 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 181 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner);
June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 55-56 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid); Tran-
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months leading up to the shooting and had chronic homicidal and suicid-
al thoughts.37
In addition to the symptoms of mental illness he exhibited around
the time of the shooting, Mr. Holmes also became floridly psychotic in
the Arapahoe County Jail approximately four months after his arrest.38
He was transported to the Denver Health Medical Center where numer-
ous physicians and psychiatrists treated him.39 All of these doctors con-
curred that Mr. Holmes was suffering from psychosis and delirium and
was not malingering or feigning his symptoms.40 Evidence of this florid-
ly psychotic episode introduced at trial lent further support to the foren-
script of Record at 44-45, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 3, 2015)
[hereinafter June 3 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
37. See, e.g., June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 140-41 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Jonathan Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 152, 169-70 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. Jeffrey Metzner); Transcript of Record at 15-16, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. June 1, 2015) [hereinafter June 1 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. William
Reid). Mr. Holmes voluntarily sought mental health treatment in the spring of 2012 and disclosed to
Dr. Lynne Fenton, his treating psychiatrist, that he was having homicidal thoughts three to four times
a day during their first meeting. Transcript of Record at 184, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522
(Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 16, 2015) [hereinafter June 16 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Lynne Fenton).
38. Mr. Holmes began exhibiting bizarre and disorganized behavior in the jail, including lying
naked and catatonic in a frozen position on the floor on his stomach with his arms twisted up and his
legs bent up in the air, smearing feces, licking the walls, speaking gibberish, eating paper cups, and
attempting to do a backwards summersault with a cup on his penis. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at
48-53, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 30, 2015) [hereinafter June 30
Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Sandra Paggen); Transcript of Record at 178, People v.
Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 29, 2015) [hereinafter June 29 Transcript] (refer-
encing the testimony of Dr. John Craig Holland); June 29 Transcript, supra, at 281-82 (referencing
the testimony of Sean Robison). He became unresponsive to jail staff and refused to eat or drink as a
result of auditory hallucinations in the form of voices telling him not to eat. See, e.g., June 30 Tran-
script, supra, at 54-55 (referencing the testimony of Sandra Paggen); June 30 Transcript, supra, at
123-24 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra, at 194
(referencing the testimony of Dr. John Craig Holland).
39. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 14-34, People v. Holmes, 12CRI 522 (Arapahoe Dist.
Ct. July 6, 2015) [hereinafter July 6 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Christopher Col-
well); June 30 Transcript, supra note 38, at 115-20 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth
Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 63-70, 113, 171, 174-75 (referencing the testi-
mony of Dr. Rachel Davis, Dr. Phillip Weintraub, and Dr. John Craig Holland).
40. Four doctors from Denver Health Medical Center (three psychiatrists and an emergency
medicine physician) testified at trial. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The psychiatrists
explained that Mr. Holmes exhibited many signs and symptoms consistent with psychosis, including
catatonia, disorganized behavior, nonsensical speech, and auditory and visual hallucinations. See,
e.g., June 30 Transcript, supra note 38, at 119-20, 123-25 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Eliza-
beth Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 73-74, 80-82 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. Rachel Davis); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 190-91, 214 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. John Craig Holland). Mr. Holmes was administered antipsychotic medication in the hospital,
which dramatically improved his condition. See, e.g., June 30 Transcript, supra note 38, at 121
(referencing the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 119
(referencing the testimony of Dr. Phillip Weintraub); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 180-81,
199 (referencing the testimony of Dr. John Craig Holland). The emergency medicine physician, Dr.
Colwell, testified that when Mr. Holmes first arrived at the hospital, he responded to questions with
"nonsensical words" and was moderately dehydrated, but his dehydration level on its own was not
severe enough to have caused the delirium and altered mental status Mr. Holmes was exhibiting at
that time. See July 6 Transcript, supra note 38, at 25, 32-33 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Chris-
topher Colwell).
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sic experts' conclusions that Mr. Holmes suffers from a serious and
chronic mental illness on the schizophrenia spectrum of disorders.
There was also uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Holmes was "ge-
netically loaded" to develop a psychotic disorder.42 There is a history of
significant mental illness on both sides of Mr. Holmes's family.4 3 At
trial, the defense introduced evidence that Mr. Holmes's maternal grand-
father suffered from a psychotic illness, for which he was hospitalized,
and that Mr. Holmes's paternal grandfather also suffered from a severe
and disabling mental illness that required hospitalization." In addition,
Mr. Holmes's aunt-the twin sister of his father-has schizoaffective
disorder, which is the same illness with which court-appointed psychia-
trist Dr. Jeffrey Metzner and defense-retained psychiatrist Dr. Jonathan
Woodcock diagnosed Mr. Holmes.45 The experts testified at trial that
schizophrenia is a disease with a strong genetic component and that Mr.
Holmes was at an increased risk of developing schizophrenia s a result
of his family history of mental illness." Mr. Holmes was also twenty-
four years old at the time of the shooting, which is within the age range
during which males most frequently experience the onset of schizophre-
nia and related illnesses.47
C. Did "Mental Illness" and "Evil" Reallv Coexist in This Case?
Nevertheless, even in the face of this strong, unrefuted evidence of
mental illness, the questions evoked by the "evil" narrative remain: Even
if Mr. Holmes is mentally ill, how much of a role did that mental illness
play in the shooting? Did "moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion
growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives and kindred evil
41. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 158-60 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Raquel Gur); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 86, 141-43 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Jeffrey Meztner); Transcript of Record at 40-42, 125, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. June 5, 2015) [hereinafter June 5 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. William
Reid).
42. See June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153.
43. See June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 157-58 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jona-
than Woodcock).
44. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 82 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Meztner);
June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 87 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
45. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 83 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 159 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Wood-
cock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner);
June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 83-86 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
46. Dr. Metzner testified:
[T]here's also no question that there's a genetic component to schizophrenia. Doesn't
mean if you have a family history of schizophrenia that you're going to get schizophre-
nia. But you're more likely to get schizophrenia if you have a family history; just like if
you have a family history of heart disease, you're more likely to get it.
June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153. Dr. Reid noted, "[l]t's certainly true that, if certain kinds of
close relatives have clear schizophrenia, your risk goes up substantially." June 5 Transcript, supra
note 41, at 79.
47. See June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 152 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey
Metzner).
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conditions,"4 8 rather than mental illness, lead Mr. Holmes to commit this
horrible act of violence?
The prosecution's answer to this question at trial was yes.49 It inti-
mated that Mr. Holmes's motives to commit the shooting were largely
unrelated to whatever mental illness he had.o It suggested that Mr.
Holmes opened fire on the theater, not because of his delusional and psy-
chotic belief that he could increase his human capital by killing as many
people as possible, but because he became angry and disillusioned after
his first and only girlfriend broke up with him in early 2012, and he be-
gan to struggle academically in graduate school.5' In other words, its
theory was that Mr. Holmes somehow set his mental illness aside to
make reasoned decisions rooted instead in anger, hate, vengeance, and
selfishness. The prosecution posited that Mr. Holmes's mental illness did
not cause the shooting; instead, it merely coincided with these preexist-
ing character defects.52
However, none of the experts who forensically examined Mr.
Holmes endorsed this theory. To the contrary, all four of the psychiatrists
who testified at trial agreed that it was Mr. Holmes's mental illness, ra-
ther than some sort of bad character, that caused him to commit these
horrific crimes.
Dr. Metzner-the first court-appointed psychiatrist to examine Mr.
Holmes-made it unequivocally clear that, in his opinion, the tragic and
horrible shooting was a direct result of Mr. Holmes's illness and that,
without the mental illness, the shooting would never have taken place.3
Dr. Metzner further opined that, although Mr. Holmes did not meet the
criteria for legal insanity, it was very clear that his appreciation of the
wrongfulness of his actions was significantly impaired as a result of his
psychotic thinking.54
48. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101.5(l)(b) (2016). Colorado's insanity statute distinguishes
these conditions from a mental disease or defect that could cause a person to be legally insane. See
id. § 16-8-101.5 (defining "mental disease or defect" for purposes of legal insanity, and noting that
"care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease or defect with moral obliquity, mental
depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives and kindred evil condi-
tions").
49. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 196-97, 200-03, 205-09, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 30, 2015) [hereinafter July 30 Transcript]; Transcript of Record
at 7-18, 20-23, 33-35, 46-48, 54-55, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRl522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
14, 2015) [hereinafter July 14 Transcript] (referencing an uncertified rough transcript); June 5 Tran-
script, supra note 41, at 153-54; Transcript of Record at 70, 85-90, 102, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2015) [hereinafter April 27 Transcript].
50. See, e.g., July 30 Transcript, supra note 49, at 88-90.
51. See, e.g., July 30 Transcript, supra note 49, at 210-12, 218-19; July 14 Transcript, supra
note 49, at 7-18, 20-23, 33-35, 46-48, 54-55; June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 153-54; April 27
Transcript, supra note 49, at 70, 85-91.
52. See July 30 Transcript, supra note 49, at 88-90.
53. Transcript of Record at 89-92, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
27, 2015) [hereinafter July 27 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner).
54. Id.
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Dr. William Reid-the second court-appointed psychiatrist to ex-
amine Mr. Holmes-likewise testified as follows on cross-examination:
Q: And it's your opinion, sir, that, absent his mental condition, we
wouldn't be here at all, would we?
A: That's a true statement.
Q: This crime would never have taken place without this mental ill-
ness?
A: That's true in my opinion, yes.
Dr. Woodcock and Dr. Raquel Gur, the defense-retained psychia-
trists, also agreed. Dr. Woodcock testified that there was no doubt in his
mind that Mr. Holmes was psychotic when he saw him in the jail just
four days after the shooting and that he saw "no rational reason for the
shooting."56 Dr. Gur testified that she did not find a nonpsychotic reason
for the shooting, and she agreed that "there wouldn't have been a shoot-
ing at all" but for the existence of Mr. Holmes's psychotic illness.
Moreover, even the court-appointed experts who testified on the
prosecution's behalf during the merits phase of the trial roundly rejected
the prosecution's suggestion that Mr. Holmes committed the shooting
because of his failures in school as well as his personal life. Dr. Metzner
explained that, in his opinion, neither Mr. Holmes's breakup with his
girlfriend nor his academic difficulties caused him to commit the shoot-
ing.58 He explained that "it's very common to see someone who is - - has
the underlying genetic predisposition to schizophrenia to have their first
psychosis triggered by stress."59 In other words, the breakup and Mr.
Holmes's academic struggles were not causes of, or motives for, the
shooting, but rather potential triggers that precipitated his first psychotic
break.60 Dr. Reid likewise repudiated these motives as significant con-
tributors to Mr. Holmes's decision to commit the shooting.6 '
55. June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 125 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
56. Transcript of Record at 165, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June
26, 2015) [hereinafter June 26 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Woodcock);
June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 103 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Woodcock).
57. July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 133 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel Gur).
58. June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 151.
59. Id. at 152.
60. See id. at 151. However, Dr. Metzner explained that "I could be wrong on that" and that
Mr. Holmes may have become psychotic at the time that he did even without these stressful events in
his life, as "it could have just been the natural course of his illness," especially given that "the most
frequent onset of schizophrenia [in men] is in the early 20s." Id.
61. The prosecution attempted to downplay Dr. Reid's testimony on cross-examination that,
absent his mental illness, the crime would never have taken place, by asking him on redirect exami-
nation whether he agreed that "[b]ut for his girlfriend dumping him . . . could we say that this
wouldn't have happened?" Dr. Reid responded, "I wouldn't go so far -- he was planning pretty
carefully. Anything's possible. Certain things may have changed, but I don't think that was a big
part of why he did this." June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 153-54 (referencing the testimony of
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Additionally, not a single expert testified, or even suggested, that
Mr. Holmes fit the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder,
which is perhaps the mental condition that is most closely aligned with
traits that the average layperson might perceive as "evil." 62 Dr. Reid
agreed that there is "no indication at all" that Mr. Holmes has antisocial
personality disorder,63 and Dr. Metzner testified that he "ruled out anti-
social personality disorder" as a diagnosis for Mr. Holmes.6
Finally, another significant fact cuts against the narrative that the
shooting is attributable to Mr. Holmes's "evil" nature, rather than his
mental illness: Mr. Holmes's behavior in the months leading up to and
including the shooting was entirely inconsistent and completely out of
character with the person he had been for his entire life.
In preparation for trial, both sides conducted an exhaustive investi-
gation of Mr. Holmes's life history. What that investigation revealed was
that he was a happy, social, and affectionate child who came from a lov-
ing and supportive upper-middle-class family.6 5 None of Mr. Holmes's
neighbors, friends, fellow students, teachers, professors, coworkers, or
family who testified at trial identified Mr. Holmes as emotionally reac-
tive, self-important, mean-spirited, attention seeking, or overly sensitive
in the face of rejection. To the contrary: witnesses described Mr.
Holmes, throughout his life and prior to the time period leading up to the
shooting, as self-deprecating, quiet, respectful, and kind. He was never
Dr. William Reid). Dr. Reid gave a similar response to the prosecution's suggestion that Mr.
Holmes's "conclusion that he had no career in science" caused the shooting. Id. at 154. When
pushed on these points, Dr. Reid ultimately reiterated to the jury in no uncertain terms, "I believe
there is a substantial relationship between the presence of the mental illness and the eventual carry-
ing out of the event." Id. at 155.
62. The essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is "[a] pervasive pattern of disre-
gard for and violation of the rights of others, occurring since age 15 years." AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, supra note 30, at 659. Diagnostic criteria include:
Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for person-
al profit or pleasure, . . . [i]rritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physi-
cal fights or assaults, . . . [r]eckless disregard for safety of self or others, . . . [and] [1]ack
of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or
stolen from another.
Id. The DSM-5 further indicates that persons with antisocial personality disorder "may repeatedly
lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger" and "frequently lack empathy and tend to be callous, cyni-
cal, and contemptuous of the feelings, rights, and sufferings of others." Id at 660.
63. June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 284.
64. June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 82.
65. Transcript of Record at 71-72, 88-89, 163-64, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapa-
hoe Dist. Ct. July 29, 2015) [hereinafter July 29 Transcript]; July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at
182-84, 242, 246-47; Transcript of Record at 50-53, 62-63, 122-27, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 23, 2015) [hereinafter July 23 Transcript].
66. See, e.g., July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at 223-24, 255-56, 266-67; July 23 Tran-
script, supra note 65, at 64-65, 76, 79, 132, 155-56, 171-72; Transcript of Record at 70-71, People
v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. May 13, 2015) [hereinafter May 13 Transcript];
Transcript of Record at 178-180, 245-47, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct.
May 11, 2015) [hereinafter May II Transcript].
67. See, e.g., July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at 172, 246, 253, 263, 265, 267, 269; July 23
Transcript, supra note 65, at 51, 62-63, 103, 146.
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a poor loser, selfish, or self-centered.6 8 He handled rejection and disap-
pointments in his life by withdrawing inward and was a person who
avoided the limelight.
If it is true that Mr. Holmes is not just mentally ill, but "evil" as
well, then either (1) his true "evil" nature suddenly sprang forth when he
experienced some mild personal difficulties during his first year in grad-
uate school and caused him to drop out of school; dye his hair orange;
spend thousands of dollars on weapons, ammunition, and ballistic gear
(despite being a frugal person his entire life who had no prior interest in
guns); build a series of homemade explosive devices in his apartment;
plan and execute a mass murder; and throw his entire life and future
away; or (2) he was secretly sinister his entire life but managed to mas-
terfully fool every person who came into contact with him from a young
age, including his own family, into thinking that he was a good person
until the events of July 20, 2012.
The alternative, of course, is what the evidence actually supports
and what we, his attorneys, sincerely believe: Mr. Holmes's chronic and
serious mental illness caused him to commit this horrific crime. After
years of displaying more subtle, negative symptoms of mental illness that
were mistaken by those who knew him for shyness and other personality
quirks, Mr. Holmes began to exhibit more overt symptoms of psychosis
in early 2012 as schizophrenia began to take hold of his brain during his
first year of graduate school.69 And he was in the throes of his first psy-
chotic break when he planned and committed the terrible and tragic
shooting at the Century 16 movie theater.70
D. The Appeal of the False Narrative of "Evil"
If the narrative of "evil" is not actually supported very well by the
facts in the case, then why has it become such a prominent feature of the
discourse about Mr. Holmes? One obvious explanation is that it is more
justifiable to seek the death penalty against a person who is viewed as
"evil" rather than against someone who is legitimately sick, and the
elected district attorney's attempts to advance this narrative in the media
could be perceived as an effort to defend his decision to spend millions
of taxpayer dollars to push the case to trial and to reject the defense's
offer to plead guilty to all charges in exchange for a life sentence.
However, there is more to it than that. Regardless of what Mr.
Brauchler's intentions were, or whether he genuinely believed Mr.
Holmes was evil, the fact is that this narrative seems to be one that has
been readily accepted and embraced by the media and the public. It
68. See July 23 Transcript, supra note 65, at 95.




seems to be what people want to believe. We think there are several rea-
sons this might be.
First, the narrative of "evil" offers a clear explanation for an other-
wise incomprehensible tragedy. Deciding that Mr. Holmes-or other
perpetrators of mass violence, for that matter-is inherently "evil" allows
us as a society to divide up the world in terms of "good" and "bad" in a
way that makes sense. It offers a simplistic, black-and-white way of
viewing a situation that requires little further discussion. Some people
are just "evil," and so they do terrible things that the rest of us, who are
not "evil," could not even fathom. There is no rehabilitating someone
who is evil, so the best thing to do when we encounter someone like this
is to simply exterminate him or her. End of discussion. This narrative is
particularly appealing in Mr. Holmes's case because, on the face of it, his
crime, which, it turned out, was borne of a psychotic and delusional be-
lief system about "human capital," had no other obvious motive like
*71money, sex, religion, racism, politics, or terrorism.
Second, there is a sense in which branding someone as "evil" makes
us feel safer from ourselves. Even if we do not understand the origins of
"evil," the narrative that people like Mr. Holmes are "evil" reassures us
that we don't have to fear one of our own committing a mass atrocity like
the Aurora theater shooting. While the threat of a horrific crime occur-
ring still exists within this narrative of "evil," at least the threat comes
from people who are outside the bounds of humanity and have nothing in
common with the rest of us. We need not look inward, nor is there any
need-or justification-for feeling any sort of compassion for the "evil"
one. As the psychiatrist Knoll points out,
[D]epicting an enemy as evil helps foster an obligation to oppose and
dispose of him. Because he is evil, there is little need to concern one-
self with his health, welfare, or gaining a better understanding of him.
All of this can be done free of guilt, for those who are evil bring
about their own just desserts.72
Finally, and relatedly, casting someone who has committed a horrif-
ic crime, such as Mr. Holmes, as "evil" absolves us as a society from
playing any role in the horrors that have occurred. A person who is "evil"
is exclusively responsible for his or her own conduct. It is not our fault
they became the way that they are or did the awful things that they did.
Moreover, because they are just "evil," there is nothing we could have
71. See July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 133-34 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 26 Transcript, supra note 56, at 140-41 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan
Woodcock).
72. Knoll, supra note 20, at 114.
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done to stop them. In other words, "[T]here is a social virtue to outlining
the face of evil; society is exonerated and bears no responsibility."73
E. The Damage Done by the "Evil" Myth
But labeling a person as "evil," especially a person who is indisput-
ably, seriously mentally ill like Mr. Holmes, comes at a serious cost. It is
problematic and troubling to adopt this way of thinking for a number of
reasons.
As an initial matter, it sets us back several centuries in terms of the
way we think about mental illness in this country. We have historically
treated people with mental disorders with "contempt, fear, and cruelty,
perhaps due to the belief that mental disorders stemmed from parental
misdeeds, demonic possession, or deficient character."74 As of 2009, an
estimated "71% of Americans still believe[d] that mental illness is
caused by mental weakness, 65% believe[d] that mental illness is the
product of poor parenting, and 35% believe[d] that mental illness is a
form of retribution for sinful or immoral behavior."75 We can swiftly
dispose of difficult discussions about seriously mentally ill people like
Mr. Holmes by branding them as "evil" and banishing them from socie-
ty, as the court did during the formal sentencing hearing in this case
when it demanded that the sheriffs deputies "[g]et the defendant out of
my courtroom, please."76 But if we continue to do so, we will ensure that
the American public remains ignorant of essential facts about mental
illness, including how to recognize early signs and symptoms of psycho-
sis and serious mental disorders. While it is certainly the case that most
mentally ill people do not commit tragic acts of violence, a number of
those who do commit such acts, including Mr. Holmes, are mentally ill. 7 7
It does not help us advance efforts to detect mental illness or prevent
mass violence by pretending that this is not true.
Second, clinging to the simplistic narrative of "evil" prevents us
from taking a hard look at the myriad and complex ways that we as a
73. Id. at 109.
74. Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON
L. REV. 469, 475 (2009).
75. Id.
76. 'Get the Defendant Out of Mv Courtroom,' Judge Says in Sentencing James Holmes, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-james-holmes-
sentenced-20150826-story.html (quoting statement of Carlos Samour Jr., Dist. Ct. Judge).
77. A 2015 law review article published in the Howard Law Journal notes that "[s]everal
large-scale studies have indicated that serious mental illness is a risk factor for violence" and that
"serious mental illness's greatest effect in increased violent crime is in substantially greater homi-
cide." David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Reforming Mental Health Law to Protect Public Safety
and Help the Severely Mentally Ill, 58 How. L.J. 715, 727, 734 (2015). With respect to mass mur-
ders specifically, the authors cite to "[a] study of 30 adult mass murderers and 34 adolescent (19
years old or younger) mass murderers [which] found a very high rate of serious mental illness among
the adults." Id. at 736. The article also notes that "the killers at the Aurora theater, Sandy Hook
Elementary, Tucson, and the Washington Navy Yard had given clear signs of serious mental illness
problems to police, family, or mental health workers." Id. at 738.
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society do, in fact, contribute to the problem of mass violence. As Steiker
writes,
The communities in which heinous offenders commit their offenses
doubtless have contributed in some ways-often in crucially im-
portant ways-to their characters and their crimes. The collective's
contributions may lie in failing to offer treatment for mental illness or
other defects, in failing to protect an offender from trauma, abuse or
neglect, or more affirmatively in creating institutional or cultural
conditions that promote anti-social violence.8
The point is that our search for the truth about what we are quick to
call "evil" requires us to dig down into the complexities of the causes of
violence and examine missed opportunities. Knoll explains,
The real causes of violent or harmful behavior are always different
from the way people think of evil, because it is myth and illusion that
provide the definition. . . . To the best of our current and limited
knowledge, people are led to commit acts of intentional harm by a
complex interaction of biological, psychological, and social forces in
concert with situational variables.79
For example, it is a fact that the law permitted Mr. Holmes to pur-
chase thousands of rounds of ammunition on the Internet without raising
an eyebrow.80 It is also a fact that Mr. Holmes was able to purchase four
firearms legally and that the law allowed those purchases to take place
unbeknownst to the psychiatrist he was seeing at the time and to whom
he had disclosed having recurring homicidal thoughts.81 In addition, it is
78. Steiker, supra note 21, at 372.
79. Knoll, supra note 20, at 106.
80. See James Holmes Built Up Aurora Arsenal of Bullets, Ballistic Gear Through Unregu-
lated Online Market, CBSNEWS (Sept. 19, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/james-
holmes-built-up-aurora-arsenal-of-bullets-ballistic-gear-through-unregulated-online-market/ ("In a
world where Amazon can track your next book purchase and you must show ID to buy some allergy
medicine, James Holmes spent months stockpiling thousands of bullets and head-to-toe ballistic gear
without raising any red flags with authorities.").
81. Under Colorado law, if an individual has been involuntarily placed on a 72-hour mental
health hold or has been committed against his or her will for short- or long-term treatment, the
person's name is sent to the FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check System. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-9-123 (2016). However, Colorado law does not place any restrictions on the pur-
chases of individuals who are being treated for mental illness, nor does it require firearms dealers to
contact mental health providers who are treating potential buyers for mental illness on an outpatient
basis before a purchase can be approved. See id.; see also Nicholas Riccardi, James Holmes'Psychi-
atrist: 'Dark Knight' Shooting Suspect Was Seeing Therapist Before Massacre, HUFFINGTONPOST
(last updated Sept. 26, 2012) ("Authorities said Holmes legally purchased four guns before the attack
at Denver-area sporting goods stores - a semiautomatic rifle, a shotgun and two pistols. To buy the
guns, Holmes had to pass background checks that can take as little as 20 minutes in Colorado. State
law bars from purchasing firearms people who have been found mentally defective by a judge or
have been committed to a mental institution. The statute makes no restrictions on buyers who are
being treated for possible mental illness."). Mr. Holmes told Dr. Fenton he was having homicidal
thoughts three to four times a day but denied specific plans or targets. See June 16 Transcript, supra
note 37, at 114, 117-18 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Lynne Fenton); Ann O'Neill & Sara
Weisfeldt, Psychiatrist: Holmes Thought 3-4 Times a Day About Killing, CNN (June 17, 2015, 9:58
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/us/james-holmes-theater-shooting-fenton/.
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a fact that this psychiatrist suspected from the first day she met Mr.
Holmes that he might be psychotic and had concerns about his danger-
ousness that led her to contact the University of Colorado's Behavioral
Evaluation and Threat Assessment (BETA) team as well as Mr.
Holmes's mother.8 2 Further, it is a fact that despite these concerns, Mr.
Holmes's psychiatrist never informed his mother that her son was having
homicidal thoughts three or four times a day and also concluded she did
not have enough evidence of imminent dangerousness to involuntarily
hospitalize him.83
There are no easy answers to the issues raised by these facts, but by
pronouncing Mr. Holmes to be "pure evil" and then pushing on in search
of the next "evil" killer to banish from our midst, we disable ourselves
from even having a conversation about them. To be clear, we are not
suggesting that we should blame others for the shooting instead of Mr.
Holmes or that Mr. Holmes himself should not be held accountable for
his actions. What we are arguing is that if we distill the narrative about
this case down to a single word- "evil" -we avoid the difficult task of
investigating society's own contributions to the complex problem of
mass shootings and, thus, how to stop the next one.
The final reason this false narrative of "evil" is so problematic is
that it makes us less human when we dehumanize others. Adopting this
narrative about Mr. Holmes enables us to feel morally superior to him.
But ultimately, the narrative requires us to strip him of his humanity
while we denounce him as evil for stripping the victims of theirs. We
understand that it is a painful and difficult thing to imagine Mr. Holmes
as more than just a "monster." Perhaps for many of those directly
touched by this tragedy, it is impossible. It muddies the water considera-
bly. It may make us feel disloyal to the victims and to the community
that he ravaged. Moreover, accepting Mr. Holmes as sick, rather than
evil, raises the scary possibility that any one of us, or any one of our
loved ones, could be capable of committing unspeakable acts of violence
if we had the misfortune of suffering from a serious psychotic mental
illness that compelled us to commit acts of violence. But the truth is, and
always has been, that Mr. Holmes is sick. Schizophrenia is a complex
brain disorder that, as Dr. Gur explained, "affects almost everything that
is unique to us as human beings."4 While it may have changed Mr.
Holmes, it did not cause him to lose his humanity. But when we pretend
otherwise by adopting this false narrative of "evil," we are at significant
risk of lessening ours.
82. See June 16 Transcript, supra note 37, at 138-39, 142-43 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. Lynne Fenton); O'Neill & Weisfeldt, supra note 81.
83. July 29 Transcript, supra note 65, at 54-56 (referencing the testimony of Arlene
Holmes); June 16 Transcript, supra note 37, at 222 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Lynne Fenton).
84. July 6 Transcript, supra note 39, at 238 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel Gur).
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II. THE MYTH OF THE "HOLDOUT" JUROR
Immediately after the jury returned its verdict on August 7, 2015,
one juror-Juror 17-elected to speak to the media in the parking lot of
the courthouse about the jury's deliberations and verdict.85 Juror 17 made
it clear that while there was one juror who was "solidly in favor of life
imprisonment," there were also two others who "had not made a com-
plete decision."' According to Juror 17, the nine other jurors were in
favor of the death penalty.87 She explained that they "deliberated the
entire time," and that "all the jurors were very respectful, of course, of
others' opinions," but in the end "could not come to a unanimous verdict
on death."88 She also stated very clearly that, for the jurors who were not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate sen-
tence, "mental illness was the issue" and that, while they all agreed that
Mr. Holmes did not meet the narrow legal definition of insanity in Colo-
rado, many of the jurors felt that "the mental illness played into his plans
and actions."89
Despite her explanation that there were three jurors who were con-
sidering a life sentence for Mr. Holmes because of his mental illness,
Juror 17's comments almost immediately produced sensational headlines
about the "lone holdout" juror who was "likely all that stood between
[the] theater shooter and [a] death sentence."90 A handful of examples
from an Internet search for articles published about the Holmes case
shortly after Juror 17's interview reveal headlines such as "One Holdout
Juror Was Likely Why James Holmes Avoided Death Penalty,"91 "Juror
Says Holdout Would Not Budge on James Holmes Death Penalty,"92
"Theater Shooter Spared From Death Penalty By One Juror's Holdout,"93
85. Carly Moore, Juror 17 Reveals Details of Verdict, at Least 1 Theater Shooting Juror Was







90. Peter Holley, A Lone Holdout Was Likely All That Stood Between Theater Shooter and
Death Sentence, Juror Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/08/08/a-lone-holdout-was-likely-all-
that-stood-between-theater-shooter-and-death-juror-says/.
91. Daniel Politi, One Holdout Juror Was Likely Why James Holmes Avoided Death Penalty,
SLATE (Aug. 8, 2015, 2:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2015/08/08/one holdoutjuror was likely whyjames_hol
mesavoided death penalty.html.
92. Phil Helsel, Juror Says Holdout Would Not Budge on James Holmes Death Penalty, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2015, 12:54 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/juror-says-holdout-
would-not-budge-james-holmes-death-penalty-n406346.
93. Sadie Gurman, Theater Shooter Spared from Death Penalty by One Juror's Holdout,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2015, 10:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/theater-
shooter-spared-from-death-penalty-by-one-jurors-holdout_55cf4564e4b0ab468d9d7a8b.
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and "Juror Says a Single Holdout Prevented Death Penalty for James
Holmes."94
A. The Appeal of the "Holdout" Myth
The explanation for why this "holdout" narrative took hold in the
public discourse is more straightforward than the narrative about "evil."
This narrative appears to have come about by a combination of two fac-
tors. First, the narrative emerged in part as a result of the mainstream
media's attempt to simplify and sensationalize Juror 17's comments.9 5
Second, the narrative took shape as a result of the elected district attor-
ney's aggressive bid to defend his decision to seek the death penalty
against Mr. Holmes against critics who argued that he should have ac-
cepted the defense's repeated offers to plead guilty in exchange for a life
sentence.96 At a press conference immediately after the verdict was an-
nounced, the district attorney pondered, "What was it that hung up the
jurors?"97 It did not take long before explicit misinformation about the
dynamics in the jury room and the opinions of the two so-called fence-
sitters was disseminated through the media.
Following an interview with Mr. Brauchler approximately a week
after the verdict, the Associated Press wrote, "The lone holdout felt just
as strongly that Holmes should get a life sentence as the 11 other jurors
believed he should die for the 2012 shooting, District Attorney George
94. Claudia Koerner, Juror Says a Single Holdout Prevented Death Penalty for James
Holmes, BUzzFEED NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015, 10:05 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/claudiakoemer/single-hold-out-juror-james-holmes-verdict#.yu92YMvXJ.
95. The media has put forth a similar narrative in other high-profile cases involving so-called
"holdout" jurors. For example, in addition to Mr. Holmes's case, fairly recently, the media has
pursued story lines characterizing the outcomes in the cases of Jodi Arias and Pedro Hernandez
(charged with murdering six-year-old Etan Patz in New York in 1979) as the result of a lone "hold-
out" juror who frustrated the majority. See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, The Perils of Being the Juror Who
Did Not Want Jodi Arias to Die, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming-mix/wp/2015/03/17/holdout-juror-in-jodi-arias-
sentencing-says-shes-getting-threats/ ("The holdout who hung up the jury in Jodi Arias's sentencing
trial earlier this month has spoken out amid backlash from fellow jurors who wanted to sentence
Arias to death."); Jen Chung, Most Etan Patz Jurors Still Hate the Holdout Who Forced Mistrial,
GOTHAMIST (June 11, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://gothamist.com/2015/06/l l/etanpatzjurorshate.php
("While prosecutors are moving forward with a new trial, many jurors from the last one are still
angry that the previous, grueling trial ended in mistrial because one juror believed that Hernandez
was innocent. The forewoman said, 'There is going to be a retrial because of one individual with a
huge ego and a small heart."').
96. Immediately after the verdict was announced, the media began posing questions to Mr.
Brauchler about his decision to push the case to trial rather than accept a plea deal offered by the
defense. See, e.g., Kirk Mitchell, DA Brauchler Defends Decision to Seek Death Penalty Against
Holmes, DENV. POST (Aug. 7, 2015, 8:54 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/theater-shooting-
trial/ci_28605354/da-brauchler-defends-decision-seek-death-penalty-against ("District Attorney
George Brauchler defended his decision to seek the death penalty, explaining that the community
deserved to have a role in the sentence of a mass murderer who tried to kill hundreds. 'This kind of a
crime cries out for the community to be involved in the sentence,' Brauchler said after the jury
handed down its sentence to James Holmes on Friday.").
97. Id. (quoting statement of George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
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Brauchler said, based on prosecution interviews with some of the pan-
el."98 The L.A. Times reported Mr. Brauchler as stating,
Wobbler is even too strong of a term. They had gone around the
room at some point and said, "OK, how strong are you on your posi-
tion?" They had gotten 10 [on a scale of I to 10 to gauge how strong
the positions were] from everybody and eight on these two.99
According to another article, Mr. Brauchler stated, "What we've
discovered from the other jurors is that 'waffler' may be too generous a
term. These were people who were heavily leaning toward death but they
wanted to continue to deliberate and talk about it."' 00 The article reports
that he added,
[T]he jurors that have spoken to [us] have told us, "You guys put on
a great case. There's nothing you could have done . . . WE were sur-
prised at the hold out juror." They said this juror had never raised any
of the issues that came out at the end during any other phase of the
deliberations. They were frustrated as well.' 0'
This misinformation about the jurors' penalty phase deliberations
finally prompted a second juror to speak to the Denver Post seven weeks
after the trial in an effort to correct the record.102 This juror, who asked to
remain anonymous, identified herself, not as the "holdout," but as one of
the two other jurors who were not convinced that death was the appropri-
ate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt: "There were three," she said.0 3
"Not one."'" She told the Denver Post that "she decided to end her si-
lence because she could no longer bear to watch the weight of public
scrutiny - what she described as a 'witch hunt' - fall solely on the
shoulders of her fellow juror."'05 In stark contrast to the narrative pro-
moted in the media that the two jurors who were unsure of their decision
were leaning heavily towards death, this juror told the Denver Post that
"she is adamant that death was not an appropriate sentence for
Holmes."'06 The juror explained that Mr. Holmes's severe mental illness
"ruled out death" as a punishment in her opinion.107 Its the fact that
98. Gunnan, supra note 93.
99. Maria L. La Ganga, James Holmes Prosecutor Talks About the One Holdout Juror Who
Spared the Killer's Life, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-holmes-da-qa-20150824-story.html (quoting interview with George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
100. McKinley, supra note 4 (quoting interview with George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
101. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting interview with George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
102. Jordan Steffen, Aurora Theater Shooting Juror Breaks Silence, Says 3 Voted for Life,
DENV. POST (Oct. 2, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/theater-shooting-
trial/ci_28911988/aurora-theater-shooting-juror-breaks-silence-says-3.
103. Id. (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
104. Id (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. ("While the juror does not feel Holmes deserved a life sentence, his severe mental
illness also ruled out death, she said.").
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mental illness is there," she stated, echoing much of what Juror 17 told
the media about the reason three jurors were not convinced that death
was the appropriate sentence for Mr. Holmes.'0 8 While she expressed
deep sorrow for the victims and their families, she maintained, "I know
that it [the verdict resulting in a life sentence] was the appropriate an-
swer."l09
B. The Damage Done by the "Holdout" Myth
Based on the statements of the two jurors who have spoken to the
press, it is clear that the narrative of the single "holdout" who dug in his
or her heels and mystified and shocked the other jurors with his or her
unexplained decision to vote for life is not factually correct. Moreover,
this characterization of the jury's deliberations is detrimental to the pub-
lic's understanding of the issues in the case because it perpetuates an
overly simplistic and legally inaccurate view of the jury's task in a capi-
tal sentencing trial. First, it confuses the kind of decision-making re-
quired of juries in capital sentencing proceedings with those required of
juries in other types of proceedings where an individual's life is not at
stake. Second, this narrative invites speculation that an individual with a
political agenda infiltrated the jury, rather than focusing on the jurors'
actual, stated reason for the life verdict: Mr. Holmes's mental illness.
1. The Task of the Jury in a Capital Sentencing Proceeding
The term "holdout" itself connotes negative images of an individu-
al, determined to stymie the will of the majority, who stubbornly-
perhaps irrationally-refuses to engage with the others and "withholds
agreement or consent upon which progress is contingent.""l0 This term is
arguably appropriate to apply when discussing the dynamics at play in a
non-capital case, or the merits phase of a capital case, where a defend-
ant's guilt or non-guilt is at issue, unanimity is required for the jury to
return a valid verdict, and non-unanimity results in a hung jury and a
potential retrial."' However, it is plainly inappropriate to use this term to
describe a non-unanimous result in a capital sentencing proceeding in
Colorado.
For forty years, the United State Supreme Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence has required individualized sentencing in capital cas-
es. In Woodson v. North Carolina,"l2 the Court held "that in capital cases
the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
108. Id. (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
109. Id. (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
110. Holdout, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/holdout (last visited
May 2, 2016).
111. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-10-108 (2016) ("The verdict of the jury shall be unanimous . .
."); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) (2016) ("If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury
may be directed to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged.").
112. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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requires consideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutional-
ly indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."'
13
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly explained that, unlike the factu-
al decisions a jury makes when deciding whether a defendant is guilty or
not guilty, the jury's task in a capital sentencing proceeding requires
them to give a "reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime."I 14
The Court has likewise held that the moral decisions involving the
assessment of mitigating evidence that jurors must make in a capital sen-
tencing trial are individual decisions, rather than group decisions, and
that jurors need not unanimously agree on the existence of mitigation or
the weight they choose to assign to any particular mitigating evidence."5
Finally, Colorado, like the majority of states in the country that al-
low for capital punishment,116 requires the jury to agree unanimously
before a verdict of death can be returned.'17 By deliberate design, the
Colorado legislature put into place a system in which a capital jury's
non-unanimous sentencing decision is an entirely valid and acceptable
verdict that results in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.18
As the Colorado Supreme Court has acknowledged, "Colorado has tai-
lored its four-step death penalty process to center on the proposition that
113. Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
114. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
184 (1988)), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Ab-
dul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 263-64 (2007) ("Our line of cases in this area has long
recognized that before a jury can undertake the grave task of imposing a death sentence, it must be
allowed to consider a defendant's moral culpability and decide whether death is an appropriate
punishment for that individual in light of his personal history and characteristics and the circum-
stances of the offense."); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 261 (1988) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("Unlike the determination of guilt or innocence, which turns largely on an evaluation of objective
facts, the question whether death is the appropriate sentence requires a profoundly moral evaluation
of the defendant's character and crime.").
115. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435, 442-43 (1990) (describing how a
state capital sentencing scheme must allow each individual juror to consider mitigating factors when
deciding whether to impose death penalty, even if factors are not found unanimously by all jurors);
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 373-76 (1988) (finding that jurors cannot be precluded from
considering any mitigating evidence unless they unanimously agree).
116. The exceptions are Alabama, Florida, and Delaware, which are the only states that allow
people to be sentenced to death when jurors are less than unanimous. See Hurst v. Florida, CHARLES
HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. RACE & JUST., HARV. L. SCH. (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2015/10/hurst-v-florida/ (providing statistics about judicial
override in wake of oral argument before the United States Supreme Court in the Hurst case). The
constitutionality of non-unanimous juries was litigated in Hurst. See Brief for Petitioner at 36-52,
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (No. 14-7505). However, the Supreme Court resolved the
case on other grounds and did not address the issue of non-unanimity in its opinion. See Hurst, 136
S. Ct. 616 (2016). Thus, the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury sentencing verdicts in capital
cases remains questionable. See discussion infra note 189 and accompanying text.
117. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d) (2016) ("If the jury's verdict is not unani-
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any individual juror may ultimately trigger life imprisonment by not
agreeing to a death penalty verdict."'
1 9
Moreover, our state supreme court has held that both the cruel and
unusual punishment and due process clauses of our state constitution
require the jury in a capital case to be unanimously convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate sentence before a death
sentence can be imposed.120
In accordance with these very clear legal principles, the jurors in the
Holmes trial were given instructions during the penalty phase of the trial
explaining that the decision regarding the existence of mitigating factors
was an individual decision-not a group decision-and that the jury need
not unanimously agree that mitigating factors exist or that the same miti-
gating factors exist.121 They were told that each juror has the responsibil-
ity and authority to decide for himself or herself what constitutes a miti-
gating fact or circumstance and that "[e]ach juror must use his or her
own personal discretion, life experiences, and reasoned moral judgment
in determining for himself or herself what mitigating factors exist."'22
The court instructed the jurors that they were obligated to consult with
one another and to deliberate, but that they were not required "to agree
with the determinations, opinions, feelings, or thoughts of other ju-
119. People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 630 (Colo. 2005) (emphasis added). The Colorado Su-
preme Court has stated,
Colorado's capital sentencing scheme consists of four steps. First, it narrows the group of
individuals convicted of first degree murder at the eligibility stage by requiring that the
jury be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of at least one of the statuto-
rily specified aggravators. At the next stage, the statute contemplates that the jury will
consider evidence to "decide whether any mitigating factors exist." Third, based upon
that evidence, the jury must decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether "mitigating fac-
tors exist which outweigh any aggravating factor or factors found to exist." If the jury
finds that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the statutorily specified aggravators,
then the jury moves to the fourth and final stage of determining whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.
People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 736 (Colo. 1999) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting
People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990)).
120. See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 845 (Colo. 1991) ("A death sentence imposed in [the
absence of a unanimous finding that death is the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt]
violates requirements of certainty and reliability and is arbitrary and capricious in contravention of
basic constitutional principles. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute [eliminating the fourth step
of Colorado's capital sentencing scheme] contravenes the prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments under article 11, section 20, of the Colorado Constitution, and deprives the defendant of due
process of law under article II, section 25, of that constitution."); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786,
796 (Colo. 1990) (concluding that he standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is an implicit part of
the statutory scheme, and noting the importance of jurors understanding "the fourth step [in Colora-
do's capital sentencing scheme] is separate and independent and requires that their ultimate conclu-
sion that death is the appropriate penalty be reached only if they possess the degree of certainty that
is communicated by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt").
121. See Jury Instructions-Phase 2 of Sentencing Hearing at No. 5, People v. Holmes, No.
12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 30, 2015).
122. Id.
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rors."12 3 The court also explained to them, "You must treat the defendant
as a uniquely individual human being." 2 4
Jurors were further informed during the final phase of the sentenc-
ing proceeding that their final sentencing verdicts were not dictated by
law and that each of them was called upon to deliberate and to make de-
cisions "based on your individual reasoned moral judgment." 25 They
were told that "[n]o juror may ever decide that the defendant should be
sentenced to death unless the juror is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that death is the appropriate sentence" and that "the jury may only
return a sentence of death on a count if every juror is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate sentence on that count." 26
And the judge explained, "None of you individually, nor the jury collec-
tively, is ever required to impose a sentence of death. The law never re-
quires a death sentence."27 In fact, they were told,
If any of you is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death
is the appropriate sentence on a particular count, that ends the inquiry
with respect to that count because, in that situation, the law requires
that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole.128
Likewise, the court explained, "There is no requirement that you
explain or justify to your fellow jurors why your individual reasoned
moral judgment leads you to a particular decision on a count." 29 The
jurors were told, "After deliberating, if a juror disagrees with the rest of
the jurors, that disagreement must be respected by the other jurors and
will be respected by the Court."'30
Based on the accounts of the jurors who have spoken to the media,
the jury conscientiously followed these instructions to the letter.'3 1
In short, given the unique task of the jury in a capital sentencing
proceeding, it is misleading to characterize the jury's verdict as the result
of a lone holdout thwarting a majority vote for death. Even if it were
123. Id. at No. 21.
124. Id. at No. 7.
125. Jury Instructions-Phase 3 of Sentencing Hearing at No. 3, People v. Holmes, No.
12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015).
126. Id. at No. 4.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at No. 8.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Steffen, supra note 102 ("The juror said deliberations were always cordial. The
group took pride in not rushing anyone and examining key points 'with a microscope,' she said.");
Phil Tenser, Nine of the Theater Shooting Jurors Were in Favor of the Death Penalty, According to
Juror No. 17, 7NEWS, http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/movie-theater-shooting/theater-
shooting-jurors-decline-interviews-after-sentencing-james-holmes-to-life-in-prison (last visited Apr.
9, 2016) ("'We all stayed cordial, and the jury instructions were very clear that this was an individu-
al decision that we each had to make with our own moral understanding of what was right and
wrong,' [Juror 17] said.").
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factually true that the jury's sentencing verdict for Mr. Holmes was the
result of one juror's decision that death was not the appropriate penalty
beyond a reasonable doubt, which, the jurors' own statements to the me-
dia reveal, was not in fact the case, that person cannot be fairly character-
ized as a "holdout" that impeded the jury's progress towards a unani-
mous verdict of death. Because each juror is required to make an indi-
vidual, reasoned moral assessment about whether another human being
should live or die,132 the law forbids jurors from pushing each other to-
wards unanimity.33 Instead, jurors are required to respect the moral
viewpoints of other jurors, even if those viewpoints differ from their
own.1 34 A life sentence resulting from one juror's position that death is
not the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt is therefore in
complete harmony with the intentions of the law. It is not the spurious
consequence of a rogue juror who "held out" and "hung up" the other
jurors and improperly prevented them from returning a death verdict.
Even had such a lone holdout juror existed, that person would not have
thwarted the law-he or she would have effectuated and honored it.
In this case, three jurors had doubts as to whether the death penalty
was the appropriate sentence for Mr. Holmes, not just one. Under those
facts, there is no question that the law not only required, but desired, a
verdict resulting in a sentence of life without parole.
2. Speculation About the Motivations of Jurors
The second problematic aspect of the "holdout" narrative is that it
encourages the public to speculate that the verdict was the result of a sole
individual who infiltrated the jury with an agenda against the death pen-
alty and distracts from what is most likely the actual basis for the life-
giving jurors' views: Mr. Holmes's mental illness.'35
To begin with, this hypothesis is extremely unlikely to be true for at
least three reasons. First, the court and the parties took incredible care
selecting the jury in this case. The court summoned an unprecedented
9,000 prospective jurors in the case, and by the defense's count, approx-
imately 3,750 citizens of Arapahoe County responded to the summons
and filled out a lengthy jury questionnaire. The process of filling out the
questionnaire alone took fifteen days in court to complete. After the de-
fense and prosecution stipulated to the release of jurors whose question-
naire responses obviously disqualified them from serving on a capital
132. See People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 792 (Colo. 1990) ("This concern for the reliability
of a jury verdict of death finds expression in United States Supreme Court decisions requiring that a
jury's determination to impose the penalty of death reflect the conviction of each juror, guided by
constitutionally sufficient statutory standards." (emphasis added)).
133. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Sadie Gurman, Theater Victim's Granddad Questions Motive of Holdout Juror,
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 24, 2015, 8:13 PM).
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case,13 6 the parties and the court then spent nine weeks and two days in-
dividually questioning prospective jurors under oath about publicity, as
well as their views on the insanity defense and the death penalty. One
hundred eleven jurors were ultimately qualified and participated in a
two-day group questioning session. From that group, twenty-four ju-
rors-twelve deliberating jurors and twelve alternates-were chosen.
Each side had the ability to exercise twenty-two peremptory strikes.'3 7
All of the jurors who ultimately deliberated over Mr. Holmes's fate
withstood this intensive death-qualification process. In fact, none of the
deliberating jurors were subject to a challenge for cause by either the
prosecution or the defense based on their death penalty views. From a
practical standpoint, the odds are extremely low that a person with a spe-
cific agenda to prevent Mr. Holmes from receiving a death sentence and
was one of 3,750 people who responded to their jury summons actually
made it on the jury. Moreover, for that to be true, the juror would have
had to have been a tremendously good liar who managed to successfully
deceive both parties, as well as the court, about his or her ability to fairly
consider both sentences for Mr. Holmes over the course of a three-month
selection process that included a written questionnaire as well as individ-
ual and group questioning.
Second, if an activist had deliberately infiltrated the jury with the
intention of sparing Mr. Holmes from death, then why didn't that person
simply end the process earlier, rather than wait until the very last phase
of deliberations? In addition to its merits phase deliberations about the
issue of insanity, the jury deliberated three separate times during the pen-
alty phase. First, it was required to determine whether it was unanimous-
ly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating
factor existed. Second, jurors deliberated over the existence of mitigation
and were required to weigh mitigation against aggravation to determine
whether they were unanimously convinced that mitigation did not out-
weigh aggravation beyond a reasonable doubt. After answering that
question in the affirmative, jurors went on to the final phase of delibera-
tions where they were required to answer the question of whether they
were unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death was
the appropriate punishment. It was only at this last and final phase that
the jury was not unanimous. The fact that the non-unanimous verdict
came at this last phase suggests that the jurors were conscientious about
136. The defense and prosecution conferred with one another after receiving each group of
questionnaires from prospective jurors and agreed to stipulate to excuse those jurors who either
expressed in their questionnaire that they were unalterably opposed to capital punishment or that
they would automatically impose the death penalty on Mr. Holmes if he were convicted of first-
degree murder.
137. The prosecution exercised twenty of their peremptory challenges, leaving two unused.
The defense exercised all twenty-two of their available peremptory challenges.
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resolving the specific issues that the law required them to answer during
each stage of deliberations.
The third reason the hypothesis that a stealth juror with an anti-
death penalty agenda threw the case is most likely false is that it is direct-
ly contradicted by the two jurors who spoke to the media about delibera-
tions.138 There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these jurors. Both of
them explicitly stated that mental illness was a significant issue for ju-
rors, including the three who were not convinced that Mr. Holmes de-
served the death penalty.'39
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the death
penalty "must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow cate-
gory of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes
them 'the most deserving of execution."'l40 In theory, the presence of an
aggravating factor or factors elevates a defendant's culpability beyond
that of an ordinary murderer.141 On the other hand, the existence of miti-
gating factors, such as intellectual impairments, a defendant's young age,
mental illness, or childhood abuse and trauma, serves to reduce a defend-
ant's moral culpability.142 This is because it is central to the Eighth
Amendment's concept of individualized sentencing that the punishment
must fit the offender, not just the offense.143 Thus, even for the worst
138. See Moore, supra note 85 (referencing the video interview with Juror 17); see also Stef-
fen, supra note 102 (referencing the text interview with anonymous juror).
139. As stated previously in this Article, Juror 17 told the media that "mental illness" was the
issue for the three jurors who were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the
appropriate sentence for Mr. Holmes. See Moore, supra note 85. Likewise, the other juror who spoke
to media told the Denver Post that Mr. Holmes's "severe mental illness also ruled out death" as a
punishment in her opinion. Steffen, supra note 102.
140. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
319 (2002)).
141. Notably, a 2013 study of Colorado's capital sentencing statute found serious constitutional
deficiencies in the statute's use of aggravating factors that ostensibly narrows the class of offenders
eligible for the death penalty in Colorado. See Justin Marceau et al., Death Eligibility in Colorado:
Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1087-88 (2013). The authors exam-
ined every murder case filed in Colorado from January 1, 1999, through December 31, 2010, to
determine which of these cases atisfied the Colorado statute's death-eligibility requirements. See id.
at 1070-71. They found that 90.4 percent of the factual or procedural first-degree murders they
examined in Colorado "were death-eligible based on the existence of at least one aggravating fac-
tor." Id at 1070-71, 1107. They noted that to the best of their knowledge, Colorado has "the highest
death eligibility rate of any jurisdiction that has been studied." Id. at 1107. They argue that their
study provides the facts, which are "unmistakably clear," to establish that "Colorado's capital statute
fails to genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible offenders." Id. at 1114. They further note that "a
scheme of 'such broad death-eligibility essentially guarantees that some defendants caught in the net
will not be among the truly "worst" offenders."' Id at 1110 (quoting Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capi-
tal Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 415 (1995)).
142. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 558-59, 568-69; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07
(2002); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 106-09 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-08
(1978).
143. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112 ("By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus 'on
the characteristics of the person who committed the crime' the rule in Lockett recognizes that 'jus-
tice . . . requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with
the character and propensities of the offender."' (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (first
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crime imaginable, the law limits the application of the death penalty only
to those defendants who jurors find to be the most personally morally
culpable.1 "
While there were clearly some very significant aggravating factors
present in Mr. Holmes's case,14 5 there was also very significant evidence
of mitigation, and of mental illness in particular. While jurors rejected
the notion that Mr. Holmes fit the narrow legal definition of insanity, as
explained in Section I, the experts in the case agreed that Mr. Holmes
would not have committed this horrible crime had he not been mentally
ill.146 Dr. Metzner testified for a second time during the penalty phase of
the trial that it was very clear that, as a result of his mental illness and
psychotic thinking, Mr. Holmes did not have the same ability to appreci-
ate how terribly wrong his actions were that a mentally healthy person
would have.14 7 Rather, Mr. Holmes's ability to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his actions was "significantly impaired" from a clinical perspec-
tive.148
The jurors' rejection of the death penalty in spite of the horrific ag-
gravation present in the case, coupled with the two jurors' post-verdict
explanations of the result, indicates that the jury's verdict came about,
quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976); then quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v.
Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 61 (1937))).
144. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Plunishment [in
capital cases] should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant....
[A]nd the sentence imposed . . . should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's back-
ground, character, and crime .... ).
145. The jury found that the prosecution proved four out of the five alleged statutory aggravat-
ing factors beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) The defendant unlawfully and intentionally, knowingly, or with universal malice
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, killed two or more
people during the commission of the same criminal episode. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-
1201(5)(i) (2016).
(2) In the commission of the offense of murder in the first degree, the defendant know-
ingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the of-
fense. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(i).
(3) The defendant committed the offense of murder in the first degree in an especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(j).
(4) The defendant committed the offense of murder in the first degree while lying in wait
or from ambush. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(f).
See generally Sentencing Hearing Phase 1 Verdict Form, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapa-
hoe Dist. Ct. July 27, 2015) (referencing the Sentencing Hearing Phase I Verdict Forms for all
twenty-four counts). The jury failed to find that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Holmes intentionally killed a child who has not yet attained twelve years of age. See
id.
146. See July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 133 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 26 Transcript, supra note 56, at 165 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Wood-
cock); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 100-01, 103 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan
Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 72, 163 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey
Metzner); June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 153 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid);
see also supra Section I.B.
147. See July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at 73-77 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey
Metzner).
148. Id. at 89-90 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner).
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not because of a surreptitious death penalty opponent intent on nullifica-
tion, but because of each individual juror's careful assessment of Mr.
Holmes's personal moral culpability. Not only is this a legally permissi-
ble basis on which to reject the death penalty, it is a core value of the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
In conclusion, the trouble with promoting the narrative of a single
"holdout" juror who either got "hung up" on the issue of mental illness
or was a stealth activist with a political agenda is that it misleads the pub-
lic about what the law requires from jurors when they are asked to make
a life or death decision in a capital case. Moreover, this narrative dis-
suades future jurors from following the law and obeying their own indi-
vidual moral conscience, which is exactly what they are supposed to do.
This narrative once again distracts from the real issues in the case and
encourages the public to cling to the misguided notion that justice was
thwarted, rather than served.
Portraying the jury's verdict as the result of the decision of an irra-
tional, isolated individual also wrongly suggests that there is no real di-
versity of opinion with respect to whether Mr. Holmes was deserving of
the death penalty. Thus, the narrative discourages the body politic from
engaging in a dialogue about whether we should continue to have the
death penalty in the State of Colorado. We believe this is an important
conversation to have.
III. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
One can draw two rather obvious conclusions from our foregoing
discussion. If one is inclined to accept the arguments we made above and
agree with the result the jury reached in the Holmes case, one might con-
clude that our system of capital punishment in Colorado works-or at
least that it worked in this case-and that no further reforms are needed.
If, on the other hand, one disagrees with us and with the result in this
case, then the response would likely be that a system of capital punish-
ment that allows a person who committed a crime as egregious as Mr.
Holmes's to escape the death penalty needs some reform.
There is, however, a third way to consider the issues we have raised
above, which is to question whether we should continue to have a system
of capital punishment in Colorado at all.
A. Who Receives the Death Penalty in the United States?
Recent research confirms what our own up-close observations of
systems of capital punishmentl49 have shown us: by and large, when the
149. Ms. Brady and Mr. King have spent a collective total of eighteen years as Chief Trial
Deputies for the Colorado State Public Defender's Office. In that capacity, they have not only been
involved in numerous capital and potential capital cases in Colorado but have also gained knowledge
about capital sentencing practices in other jurisdictions while conducting and attending national
DENVER LAWREVIEW
death penalty is imposed in this country, it is imposed upon people who,
like Mr. Holmes, have diminished personal culpability. A 2014 study of
the last 100 offenders executed in America revealed that the overwhelm-
ing majority of these offenders, nearly nine of every ten, possessed miti-
gating characteristics that demonstrated significant intellectual or psy-
chological deficits.150
The authors of the study were interested in determining how well
the existing "mitigation-facilitating procedures" for imposing the death
penalty only upon those defendants with the most extreme personal cul-
pability are working in practice.' The United States Supreme Court's
current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence includes the doctrine of indi-
vidualized sentencing discussed above and also categorically exempts
two classes of individuals from the death penalty who have been deemed
to possess insufficient personal culpability-intellectually disabled and
juvenile offenders.152 To examine the effectiveness of this mitigation
regime, the study's authors undertook a review of documentation pertain-
ing to the cases of the one hundred most recently executed capital of-
fenders in the United States.15 3 They pored over state and federal appel-
late decisions in the cases, as well as expert findings, news accounts, and
pleadings, to determine how many of these defendants fell into at least
one of the following mitigation categories: "intellectual disability, youth-
fulness, mental illness, and childhood trauma."'54
The results revealed that over half-fifty-four-of the last one hun-
dred executed offenders had been diagnosed with or displayed symptoms
of a severe mental illness.'55 Fifty percent suffered from complex trauma,
such as "severe physical abuse, sexual molestations, domestic violence,
the violent loss of immediate family and chronic homelessness."56 Thir-
ty-two of the offenders demonstrated evidence of intellectual disability,
either as a result of a borderline IQ or traumatic brain injury.5 7 And
trainings for capital defense lawyers. In addition to her capital experience in Colorado, Ms. Nelson
spent four years as a staff attorney at the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama, repre-
senting individuals on Alabama's death row.
150. See Robert J. Smith et al., The Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGs L.J. 1221, 1228-30
(2014).
151. Id. at 1223-24.
152. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) ("[J]uvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002)
(holding that "[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
impulses," mentally impaired offenders "do not act with the level of moral culpability that character-
izes the most serious adult criminal conduct" and are therefore exempt from the death penalty);
Smith et al., supra note 150, at 1222-23.
153. Smith et al., supra note 150, at 1224.
154. Id. at 1224, 1228-29 ("We considered only mitigating circumstances that demonstrate
intellectual and psychological deficits that compare to those that intellectually disabled and juvenile
offenders possess, namely: intellectual disability, youthfulness, mental illness, and childhood trau-
ma.").
155. Id. at 1245.
156. Id. at 1247.
157. Id. at 1234-35.
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more than one-third, or thirty-six percent, of these "offenders committed
a capital crime before turning twenty-five-the age at which the brain
fully matures."15 In total, eighty-seven percent of the last one hundred
executed offenders in the United States fell into at least one of these mit-
igation categories. Fifty-five percent-over half-of these defendants
had mitigation that fell into two or more categories.
To put it bluntly, it appears that in America, we are not just seeking
the death penalty against people who are damaged in some way, as we
did unsuccessfully in the Holmes case'59 as well as the Dexter Lewis
case.160 Rather, when we actually do obtain and carry out death sentenc-
es, we end up executing not evil people, but sick, damaged, and broken
people. At the very least, we are executing people who only became
"evil" because they were sick, damaged, broken, or a combination of
those things, in the first place.
B. Why Are Sick and Broken People Getting Sentenced to Death?
Why is this happening, and what accounts for the different result in
the Holmes and Lewis cases? A full discussion of the answer to this
question is well beyond the scope of this Article, but there are at least
two potentially significant factors at play: the quality of representation
many capital defendants in other jurisdictions receive at the trial level
and variations in the procedures in place that govern capital sentencing
proceedings amongst different states.
The Office of the Colorado State Public Defender is widely recog-
nized as one of the best public defender agencies in the country for
providing high-quality representation to indigent criminal defendants.161
158. Id at 1239.
159. To be clear, in our opinion, spending millions of taxpayer dollars and expending a mind-
boggling amount of effort to seek the death penalty against an obviously mentally ill person like Mr.
Holmes was the wrong decision. Morally speaking, we as a society should not try to kill people for
being sick. We maintain that the elected district attorney should have accepted Mr. Holmes's offer to
plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of life without parole instead of dragging the parties, the
victims, and the public through a painful, three-year-long process that ultimately produced the same
result.
160. Mr. Lewis was convicted of stabbing five people to death in a Denver bar. Jordan Steffen
& Matthew Nussbaum, Dexter Lewis Gets Life Sentence for Fero s Bar Massacre, DENV. POST
(Aug. 27, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28713843/jury-deliberating-feros-
bar-massacre-trial. The Denver District Attorney's Office reached plea agreements with Mr. Lewis's
co-defendants, but sought the death penalty against him. Id At trial, Mr. Lewis's attorneys presented
substantial mitigating evidence demonstrating that Mr. Lewis's entire life was marked by significant
trauma, abuse, and neglect. See id On August 27, 2015, a Denver jury could not unanimously agree
beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating evidence in the case did not outweigh the aggravation,
and Mr. Lewis was consequently sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. See id.
161. See, e.g., P. Solomon Banda, Holmes Doesn't React to Talk of Struggling Victims,
CNSNEWS.COM (Aug. 16, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/holmes-doesnt-
react-talk-struggling-victims ("Colorado defense attorney David Lane, who has been involved in a
number of death penalty cases, said there is no issue with the public defenders' abilities. 'Colorado
public defenders are the best death penalty lawyers in the United States,' Lane said."); Ben Markus,
Opening Statements to Begin Monday in Colorado Theater Shooting Trial, NPR (Apr. 27, 2015,
3:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/27/402480999/opening-statements-to-begin-monday-in-
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Our agency's enabling statute mandates that we provide the same level
of legal services to indigent persons accused of crimes that are available
to non-indigent defendants and that we conduct our office, not only in
accordance with the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, but also
with the American Bar Association standards pertaining to criminal de-
fense.6 2
With respect to capital cases, this requires our adherence to the
American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and Per-
formance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.163 Under these
guidelines, we have a number of important duties and obligations, in-
cluding the requirement to conduct a full and complete, multi-
generational investigation of our client's life history and background
dating back at least three generations;1 to "consider all legal claims
potentially available; [to] . . . thoroughly investigate the basis for each
potential claim before reaching a conclusion as to whether it should be
asserted; . . . [to] evaluate each potential claim in light of . .. the unique
characteristics of death penalty law and practice;" to present each claim
as forcefully as possible, tailoring the presentation to the particular facts
and circumstances in the client's case and to the applicable law in the
particular jurisdiction;165 to "seek a theory [of defense] that will be effec-
tive in connection with both guilt and penalty;"'66 and "a continuing duty
to investigate issues bearing upon penalty and to seek information that
supports mitigation or rebuts the prosecution's case in aggravation."67
The ABA Guidelines are not just hypothetical wish lists for capital
defense lawyers. Not only does our enabling statute require us to abide
colorado-theater-shooting-trial ("Former Colorado prosecutor Bob Grant says James Holmes is
represented by some of the best-trained and best-financed public defenders in the country."); Laura
Parker, 8 Years in a Louisiana Jail, but He Never Went to Trial, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2005, 12:47
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-29-cover-indigentsx.htm ("Among the
24 states that fully fund local defender programs, Oregon, Minnesota, Colorado and Massachusetts
are widely recognized for their programs' quality."); Jon Sarche, Karr Could Get Public Defender in
Colo., BOSTON.COM NEWS (Aug. 22, 2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2006/08/22/karr could get public defender
incolo/ ("Unlike in many states, Colorado's public defender system is well funded and well re-
spected for its work on complicated cases involving DNA evidence."); Max Wachtel, Legal Issues
for the Planned Parenthood Shooting Suspect, 9NEWS (Nov. 30, 2015, 4:50 PM),
http://www.9news.com/story/news/local/colorado-springs-shooting/2015/I1/30/legal-issues-
planned-parenthood/76571388/ ("Colorado's office of the public defender has some of the best death
penalty defense attorneys in the country, and they are dedicated to ending the practice in the state.").
162. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-101(l) (2016).
163. The enabling statute was first enacted in 1979 and references "the American bar associa-
tion standards relating to the administration of criminal justice, the defense function." Id. In 1989,
the ABA first promulgated a set of guidelines specifically devoted to setting forth the obligations of
defense counsel in death penalty cases. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 n.7 (2005). A new
version of these guidelines was promulgated in 2003. See American Bar Association Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
913, 916 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines].
164. ABA Guidelines, supra note 163, at 1024-25.
165. Id. at 1028.
166. Id. at 1047.
167. Id. at 1055.
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by them, but the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly found that
attorneys who failed to abide by the ABA Guidelines in cases in which
the death penalty was imposed provided their clients with constitutional-
ly ineffective assistance of counsel.168 We would be on legally and ethi-
cally shaky ground if we willfully chose to ignore them. And needless to
say, it takes a tremendous amount of time, energy, and financial re-
sources to attempt to fulfill our duties and obligations under these guide-
lines in every case in which the prosecution chooses to seek the death
penalty, including the Holmes and Lewis cases.
Unfortunately, it is no secret that the vast majority of individuals
facing the death penalty in this country do not receive legal representa-
tion that even comes close to satisfying the requirements set forth by the
ABA Guidelines.1 6 9 The jurisdictions that prosecute these individuals are
either unwilling or unable to abide by them for a host of complex rea-
sons.170 To be sure, there are a number of excellent, highly skilled capital
defense attorneys representing defendants at the trial level across the
country. However, stories of underfunded, overworked indigent defense
systems, of capital defendants represented by lawyers who had substance
abuse issues or were later disbarred, and of attorneys inexperienced in
capital litigation botching legal claims and missing filing deadlines are
ubiquitous in the modern era of capital punishment.'7 1 And "[w]hen law-
yers fail to conduct adequate mitigation investigation, jurors are unable
168. See, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) ("[W]e
long have referred [to these ABA Standards] as 'guides to determining what is reasonable."' (quot-
ing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396
(2000).
169. See Stephen B. Bright, The Role of Race, Poverty, Intellectual Disability, and Mental
Illness in the Decline of the Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 686-88 (2015) (providing
numerous examples and citations illustrating "[t]he remarkably poor quality of legal representation
in some capital cases and the even more remarkable indifference of courts" and noting that "[c]ourts
and prosecutors appear to have come to accept this gross ineptness by capital defense counsel, [i]t
has become part of the culture").
170. See id; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839-40 (1994) (discussing interrelated
reasons for the poor quality of legal representation in many capital cases); David Rudovsky, Gideon
and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 L. & INEQ. 371, 394-97,
398-400, 408 (2014) (arguing that the crisis in indigent criminal defense is "the direct result of a
lack of political and judicial responsibility" and providing examples of the complex forces at work in
the battle over the quality of legal representation in capital cases in Pennsylvania).
171. See, e.g., ACLU, SLAMMING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS: DENIAL OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
AND REMEDY IN AMERICA 7-8 (2010),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/HRP UPRsubmissionannex.pdf; Ken Armstrong, Death by Dead-
line, Part One, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 15, 2014, 4:30 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014//ll15/death-by-deadline-part-one; Ken Armstrong, Death
by Deadline, Part Two, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 16, 2014, 5:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/Il/16/death-by-deadline-part-two; Ken Armstrong &
Steve Mills, Part 2: Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 1999),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-991115deathillinois2-story.html; Marc Book-
man, This Man's Alcoholic Lawyer Botched His Case. Georgia Executed Him Anyway, MOTHER
JONES (Apr. 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/alcoholic-lawyer-
botched-robert-wayne-holsey-death-penalty-trial?page=1.
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to perform their moral and legal function of deciding which offenders are
truly among the most culpable offenders."l72
Procedurally speaking, while the vast majority of states, like Colo-
rado, require a unanimous jury vote to impose the death penalty, there
are several significant outliers-most notably, Alabama, Florida, and
Delaware-in which the law allows juries to recommend death sentences
even if they are non-unanimous and allows judges to override a jury's
life recommendation and impose the death penalty. Alabama and Florida
have large death row populations: Alabama currently has 185 people on
death row,1 73 and Florida's death row houses a total of 388 inmates.174
According to recent statistics published by the Charles Hamilton Hou-
ston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School, in the past
five years, the three states that allow for the imposition of the death pen-
alty following non-unanimous jury verdicts accounted for twenty-eight
percent of all new death sentences in this country.s75 In seventy-seven
percent of those new death sentences, the jury was less than unani-
mous.17 6 Had those states required juror unanimity in order to impose the
death penalty, those states would have had twenty-six death sentences,
instead of 117.177 The viability of these death sentences remains on shaky
ground after the United States Supreme Court declined to specifically
address the constitutionality of non-unanimous capital sentencing ver-
dicts in Hurst v. Florida.178 It remains to be seen whether the practice of
allowing death sentences to be imposed following non-unanimous jury
verdicts will be permitted to continue to exist in the United States or
172. Robert J. Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1173 (2015); see also Emily
Hughes, Arbitrary Death: An Empirical Study of Mitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 581, 636 (2012)
("[D]isparities in the kinds of mitigation investigations individual defendants receive are much more
serious than previously thought.").
173. See Alabama Inmates Currently on Death Row, ALA. DEP'T CORRECTIONS,
http://www.doc.state.al.us/DeathRow.aspx (last visited May 2, 2016).
174. See Corrections Offender Network. Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP'T CORRECTIONS,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/activeinmates/deathrowroster.asp (last visited May 2, 2016).
175. See Hurst v. Florida, CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. RACE & JUST., HARV. L. ScH.
(Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2015/10/hurst-v-floridal (providing statistics




178. See generally Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). In Hurst, the Supreme Court found
Florida's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
because it did not require a jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.
Id. at 622. Under Florida's then-existing scheme, the jury merely returned an advisory verdict rec-
ommending a sentence, but was not required to make specific factual findings regarding the exist-
ence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and its recommendation was not binding on the
judge. Id. at 620. Instead, Florida law required any factual findings upon which any death sentence
was based to be made by a judge. See id. The Supreme Court held that this practice violated the
Sixth Amendment but did not address the aspect of Florida's law that authorized the jury to recom-
mend a sentence of death by majority vote. Id. at 621.
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whether it will fail to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment, as have
many other questionable capital sentencing practices in recent years.179
In addition to states that allow for the imposition of the death penal-
ty upon non-unanimous jury verdicts, several states allow the prosecution
multiple tries at obtaining a death verdict in the event of non-unanimity.
California provides one example. California's capital punishment system
is notoriously troubled and dysfunctional.80 Its corrections department
houses a whopping 748 individuals on death row despite the fact that the
state has not executed anyone in nearly a decade.'8' If a California jury
fails to reach a unanimous verdict as to penalty in a capital case, the stat-
ute provides that "the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new
jury impaneled to try the issue as to what the penalty shall be."'82 Even
after the second retrial, this process can continue multiple times unless
the court, in its discretion, decides to impose a punishment of life without
parole. Likewise, Arizona, which houses 119 inmates on its death row,'83
has a capital sentencing statute requiring that a new jury be impaneled in
the event of a non-unanimous verdict on the issue of penalty.'8 4 If the
verdict is not unanimous the second time around, the court is required to
impose a sentence of life without parole.'85
Thus, in jurisdictions like the ones described above, the law makes
it easier for the prosecution to obtain death sentences for criminal de-
fendants in general, either through non-unanimous verdicts or multiple
179. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (finding that Florida rule limiting capital
defendant's ability to show intellectual disability violates Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding Louisiana capital sentencing statute unconstitutional for allowing
for death penalty for the rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding imposi-
tion of death penalty on juvenile offenders is unconstitutional); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) (Arizona statute allowing judge to find aggravating circumstance violates the Sixth Amend-
ment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding imposition of death penalty on mentally
impaired offenders unconstitutional).
180. In July 2014, a federal judge appointed by President George W. Bush found California's
capital punishment system unconstitutional due to its systemic delay and dysfunction. See Jones v.
Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068-69 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev d, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th
Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed that decision, holding that the petitioner's claim
was barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which generally prohibits federal courts
from announcing a new rule of constitutional law in a habeas case. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538,
546-53 (9th Cir. 2015). However, the appellate court did not address or dispute the underlying facts
pertaining to California's troubled scheme. It ended its opinion by stating, "Many agree with Peti-
tioner that California's capital punishment system is dysfunctional and that the delay between sen-
tencing and execution in California is extraordinary." Id at 553. Nevertheless, it concluded that
"[b]ecause Petitioner asks us to apply a novel constitutional rule, we may not assess the substantive
validity of his claim." Id.
181. See Paige St. John, California's Death Row, with No Executions in Sight, Runs Out of
Room, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:13 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-ff-death-
row-20150330-story.html; see also Condemned Inmate List, CAL. DEP'T CORRECTIONS &
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/capitaljpunishment/docs/condemnedinmatelistsecure.pdf
(last visited May 2, 2016).
182. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (2016).
183. See Death Row, ARIZ. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, https://corrections.az.gov/node/431 (last
visited May 2, 2016).
184. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(K) (2016).
185. Id. § 13-752(J)-(L), (0), (Q).
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opportunities to obtain unanimity. And the easier it is to obtain death
sentences in general, the easier it is to obtain them despite the presence
of significant mitigation in many cases, including evidence of intellectual
disability, youthfulness, mental illness, and childhood trauma.
Even this cursory overview of some of the possible explanations for
why people with diminished culpability like Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lewis
received life sentences in Colorado, while so many other capital defend-
ants throughout the country with significant mitigating factors in their
backgrounds and life histories instead received the death penalty, is trou-
bling.
C. Implications for Colorado
Critics of the verdicts in the Holmes or Lewis cases have suggested
that a variety of reforms could "fix" or "improve" the system. This past
legislative session, Republican State Senator Kevin Lundberg introduced
Senate Bill 64, which would have allowed juries to impose death sen-
tences upon a vote of 11-1.186 Lundberg expressly stated that the reason
he introduced the bill was because the result in the Holmes case "proves
that our system is inadequate."187 Fortunately, the bill died in the Senate
Judiciary Committee on a 3-2 vote.'88 Not only would that change have
placed Colorado in a tiny minority of states that allow for such a practice,
but such a change would have been constitutionally tenuous at best given
that the United States Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue.'18 In
the wake of the Holmes verdict, another Republican lawmaker in Colo-
rado introduced a bill that would have allowed prosecutors the opportuni-
186. Jordan Steffen, Colorado Bill to Allow Death Sentence Without Unanimous Vote Dies,
DENV. POST (Feb. 10, 2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci 29501405/colorado-
bill-allow-death-sentence-without-unanimous-vote (noting that Lundberg's original proposal would
have allowed a death sentence upon a vote of 9-3 but was ultimately amended at the committee
hearing to require 11 votes for a sentence of death).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). As noted previously, the Supreme Court
invalidated Florida's capital sentencing scheme on other grounds and did not address the constitu-
tionality of non-unanimous capital sentencing verdicts in its opinion. However, it seems likely that
the Supreme Court will ultimately address this issue in the near future. The Delaware Supreme Court
is currently considering the constitutionality of its capital sentencing scheme, including the practice
of allowing the death penalty upon a non-unanimous sentencing verdict. See Jessica Masulli Reyes,
Public Defenders: Death Penalty Unconstitutional, NEWS JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2016, 7:29 PM),
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/03/01/public-defenders-del-death-penalty-
law-unconstitutional/81146406/ (discussing litigation in Rauf v. State, No. 39, 2016). On May 2,
2016, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Johnson v. Alabama, an Alabama
capital case, and remanded to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals for further consideration in
light of Hurst v. Florida, indicating that it may consider the constitutionality of Alabama's capital
sentencing scheme in the near future. See Order List: 578 U.S., SUPREME COURT U.S. (May 2,
2016), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/050216zorj4ek.pdf. Moreover, the issue of
non-unanimity remains unresolved in Florida. See generally Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616. On March 7,
2016, following Hurst, Florida enacted a new capital sentencing law eliminating judicial override
but allowing for a sentencing verdict of death as long as 10 out of 12 jurors agree. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.142(3) (West 2016). The constitutionality of this new scheme has, of course, not yet
been tested.
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ty to seek death a second time if the first penalty-phase jury verdict was
non-unanimous.190 That bill, which would have made Colorado's capital
sentencing scheme even more expensive and inefficient than it already is,
also failed to receive adequate support from legislators and died in com-
mittee.1 9'
Another potential change would be to allow for more victim impact
testimony to be admissible during the penalty phase of the proceeding.
We believe in the importance of those stories and understand the desire
for them to be told. However, the jury's ultimate task at a capital sen-
tencing proceeding is to assess the defendant's moral culpability, not to
assess the amount of pain he caused.192 Exposing the jury to more heart-
breaking stories of grief and loss will not assist the jury in determining
how morally culpable a defendant is and will only increase the risk that
the jury's sentencing decision in a case will be based on arbitrary, emo-
tional factors. Moreover, such a change would be unlikely to pass muster
in light of the constitutional limitations on victim impact evidence set
forth by the Supreme Court.'93
Finally, a critic of the result in the Holmes case, claiming that we
had too many resources at our disposal, might even propose cutting our
office's budget. This would inhibit our ability to comply with the ABA
Guidelines and would provide more fodder for later arguments concern-
ing the ineffective assistance of counsel in the event of a future death
sentence. In other words, cutting our budget might increase the odds of a
death sentence, but it would simultaneously increase the risk that a court
would reverse any such sentence on appeal.
Proponents of reform should also bear in mind what happened the
last time the legislature changed Colorado's capital sentencing scheme in
a significant way. In 1995, the Colorado legislature changed Colorado's
190. See Corey Hutchins, Lawmaker: Prosecutors Need Two Chances to Win a Death Penalty
Verdict, COLO. INDEP. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/156613/death-penalty-
colorado-second-chance.
191. See John Ingold & Joey Bunch, Bills Inspired by Aurora Theater Shooting Trial Meet
Different Fates, DENV. POST (Feb. 29, 2016, 6:13 PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_29577942/bills-inspired-by-aurora-theater-shooting-trial-meet.
192. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (noting that victim impact evidence is
not offered to encourage jurors to make comparative judgments that "defendants whose victims were
assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived
to be less worthy"); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution ra-
tionale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender.").
193. In Payne, the Court held that that the Eighth Amendment did not erect a per se bar prohib-
iting victim impact testimony in a capital sentencing trial and held that the State may accordingly
offer "'a quick glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish,' or demonstrating the
loss to the victim's family and to society which has resulted from the defendant's homicide." 501
U.S. at 822 (citation omitted) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)). Acknowledging that such evidence is likely to be highly emotionally impactful, it noted
that "[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism
for relief." Id at 825.
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capital sentencing scheme from allowing for jury sentencing to sentenc-
ing by a three-judge panel.194 Proponents of the legislation "believed that
three-judge panels would result in more death sentences."9 5 The reason
for the legislation was that "[a]t the time, many citizens and legislators
felt that Colorado juries had not been aggressive enough in their applica-
tion of the death penalty."'9 6 Of course, in 2002, in Ring v. Arizona,197
the United States Supreme Court invalidated Arizona's capital sentenc-
ing statute requiring judges to make factual findings with respect to ag-
gravating circumstances.198 A year later, the Colorado Supreme Court
struck down Colorado's three-judge capital sentencing statute based on
Ring, and everyone on Colorado's death row who had received a death
sentence from a three-judge panel was resentenced to life without parole
as a result.199
What we really need to be asking ourselves is whether we want to
keep pushing ahead with reforms to make it easier for prosecutors to
obtain death sentences or even whether we want to continue the status
quo of spending extraordinary amounts of money and effort in pursuit of
the death penalty.200 Because even if the State of Colorado succeeded at
194. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 258 (Colo. 2003) ("By means of its 1995 legislation, the
Colorado General Assembly amended Colorado's death penalty statute to substitute a three-judge
panel in place of the jury for the penalty phase of the trial in a capital case; the General Assembly
left the guilt phase of the trial with the jury. What the sponsors and proponents did not anticipate in
1995 was that they were relying on an opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court which would be over-
turned some twelve years after issuance." (citation omitted)).
195. Robin Lutz, Comment, Experimenting with Death: An Examination of Colorado's Use of
the Three-Judge Panel in Capital Sentencing, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 227, 244 (2002).
196. Id. As one author noted,
For example, jurors had recently decided not to impose a death sentence on Kevin Fears,
who was found guilty of crimes which included two counts of first degree murder, one
count of attempted first degree murder, and intimidation of a witness. Jurors had also
failed to impose the death penalty on Michael Tenneson, who had killed two people in
Colorado and was suspected of killing three others in Wisconsin. As of 1994, statistics
revealed that juries in Denver County had only imposed the death penalty in one of nine
capital cases brought by the district attorney in the preceding twenty years. Rates in other
counties were similar: in the ten preceding years Adams County prosecutors attained a
death verdict in one case of five, while Jefferson County prosecutors attained death ver-
dicts in two cases of seven.
Id at 244-45 (citations omitted).
197. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
198. Id. at 609.
199. See Woldt, 64 P.3d at 259.
200. We should also note Colorado's existing capital sentencing scheme, as it is, contains a
number of features that are constitutionally problematic. For example, the scheme as currently inter-
preted by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Dunlap allows for the injection of arbitrary
factors into the criterion for death-eligibility and denigrates the jury's consideration of mitigation,
and that the statute defines death eligibility so broadly that it creates a constitutionally unacceptable
risk that the death penalty is arbitrarily enforced and applied in Colorado. See Marceau et al., supra
note 141, at 1087-88. It is also extremely troubling that all three of the inmates currently on death
row in Colorado are black men, all three were prosecuted by the Arapahoe County District Attor-
ney's office, and all three attended the same high school. See Colorado Death Penalty in Focus as
Massacre Trial Enters New Phase, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2015, 9:47 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/colorado-death-penalty_55af9aeee4b0a9b948530a4d. Alt-
hough we litigated many of these issues extensively in the Holmes case, the result in the case and the
fact that Mr. Holmes is not appealing his conviction mean that an appellate court will not review
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sentencing more people to death, the chances are good that, as a result,
the recipients of a majority of those sentences would be people with sig-
nificant intellectual or psychological deficits.
The alternative is that we could just stop. We could stop trying to
change the rules, we could stop spending all this money, and we could
stop trying to kill. Instead, we could join the chorus of public figures,
including, most recently, Pope Francis,201 Justices Breyer and Gins-
burg,202 and President Barack Obama,203 who are now questioning the
wisdom of continuing with this experiment. The death penalty does not
increase justice, make us safer, or ease the pain caused by violent crime.
The truth is that at its core, regardless of whether it may or may not have
"worked" in a particular case, the death penalty is a broken system.
When it succeeds, it largely succeeds in killing broken people. There is
something profoundly disturbing about that.
them in the context of this case. However, we continue to believe that Colorado's capital sentencing
scheme as it currently stands is vulnerable to invalidation by an appellate court in the future.
201. In a September 24, 2015, address to Congress, Pope Francis called for the abolition of the
death penalty in the United States. See Mark Berman, Pope Francis Tells Congress 'Every Life is
Sacred,' Says the Death Penalty Should Be Abolished, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/09/24/pope-francis-tells-congress-the-
death-penalty-should-be-abolished/.
202. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755-77 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that it is "highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amend-
ment").
203. On October 23, 2015, The Marshall Project released a video of an interview of President
Obama conducted by Bill Keller, in which Obama calls several aspects of the death penalty "deeply
troubling." Exclusive: Obama Calls the Death Penalty "Deeply Troubling," MARSHALL PROJECT
(Oct. 23, 2015, 3:20 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/23/watch-obama-discuss-
death-penalty-racial-profiling-with-the-marshall-project.

